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Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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Angola

The polls opened and voting began at 0600 GMT in Angola on 29 September, according to Luanda Radio, "against a backdrop of general calm and order." BBC reported on 30 September that on the first day of elections, people were "queuing up for hours and hours to vote."

Mozambique

On 29 September, Maputo Radio reported that Mozambique National Resistance, Renamo, leader Afonso Dhlakama had withdrawn from the Rome peace talks with the Government of Mozambique, saying Renamo would not sign the peace accords on 1 October as "there still remained issues to be resolved." However, according to a 30 September report from Johannesburg Radio, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha said that he held talks with Dhlakama "last night." Dhlakama "has since agreed to sign the peace agreement with the Mozambican Government."

Republic of South Africa

On 29 September, the leaders of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the homelands of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana rejected the agreements reached between State President F.W. de Klerk and ANC leader Nelson Mandela at their summit, SAPA reported. Criticizing the agreements, Inkatha leader Buthelezi said that "democracy in the country could only be reached through multi-party negotiations." He accused the ANC and the government of "hijacking the negotiations process, because the resumption of multilateral constitutional agreements would be directed by their 'extensive bilateral negotiations'." He claimed that the agreement, which he termed "the Von Ribbentrop/Molotov agreement", was "the peak of a much deeper and broader agreement between the two parties."

Ethiopia

Election Commission on Voter Registration

AB2909151492 Dakar PANA in English 1140 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Addis Ababa, 29 Sept. (ENA/PANA)—The National Election Commission of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia has said that 79.3 percent of eligible voters registered for the regional elections on 21 June, 1992 actually cast their votes.

Although this represented only nine of the 14 regions where the elections were to have taken place, the outcome was considered more than satisfactory in a country where the democratic tradition, in the contemporary sense, is just beginning to take root.

Voting has since taken place in the 10th region and self administering regional councils in 10 regions have already begun work. Elections have been postponed or only partially completed in the remaining four of the 14 regions into which the country has been divided.

The number of votes cast in the nine regions was 7.32 million, according to the commission report.

The turnout was said to be most encouraging, given the fact that the elections were held only a year after a climate of stability was restored in the more troubled areas of the country following the collapse of the "Dergue" regime in May, 1991.

Somalia

'Armed Public Uprising' Against Aidid Spreading

EA2909211392 Mogadishu Voice of the Somali Republic in Somali 1700 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Reports from Shabeellaha Hoose region [south of Mogadishu] say that an armed public uprising against the group taking orders from Aidid has become widespread in the region. The fighting started when the people in the Shabeellaha Hoose region could no longer tolerate the killing and looting by the group bent on taking away the property of the people in the region and its environs. The reports add that the fighting has now spread to the Goryooley, Marka, Afgooye, Baraawe and Wanlaweyn districts and the Shalaamboot settlement, with signs of similar fighting becoming evident in the Jubbada Sare region, where starvation and looting are rampant. It should be remembered that the power hungry group recently looted the international aid for the starving people in Bay region, risking the suspension of all assistance by the international relief agencies to Baydhabo.

Manifesto Group Accused of Shelling Civilians

EA2909213092 Mogadishu Radio Mogadishu in Somali 1700 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Fighting has broken out in (Kaaraan) district in Banaadir region between the people in northern Mogadishu and the Manifesto Group [pro-Ali Mahdi] which has of late been oppressing the people in that area. In the fighting, which has been going on since 28 September, as reported by our correspondent in Banaadir, Abbas Muhammad nur (Galayr), the Manifesto Group has been shelling the civilians, causing many deaths and injuries to the people in north and south Mogadishu. The report adds that the injured civilians were rushed to (Digfeer), Banaadir, and Madina hospitals in southern Mogadishu with the assistance of Somali Liberation Army troops.

Fundamentalists Take Northeast Town

PM2909151192 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 25 Sep 92 pp 1, 4

[Yusuf Khazim report: "Fundamentalist Forces in North Somalia Seize Strategic City"]

[Excerpts] London—Fighting has recently resumed in northeast Somalia. The Somali relief organization told AL-HAYAH yesterday that the forces of the Somali Islamic Union, a fundamentalist organization, occupied the strategic Red Sea city of Laas Qoray. And that fierce fighting was still continuing there between them and the city's Warsangeleh tribe inhabitants. Some 300 people have been killed and 400 wounded as a result.

The forces of the Islamic Union, which emerged in Somalia only recently, launched a large-scale military offensive against the coastal city of Bousaaso, which is near Laas Qoray. But forces of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia led by Colonel 'Abdallah Yusuf were able to expel them, so they retreated to the city of Qoh between Bousaaso and Laas Qoray.

Ali Matar, spokesman for the Somali relief and development agency in London, told AL-HAYAH yesterday that the Islamic Union forces had regrouped and started to move toward Laas Qoray at the beginning of last month and had captured it at the beginning of this month. But the city's Warsangeleh tribe inhabitants were still fighting hard in the hinterland to recapture it. [passage omitted]

Muhammad 'Uthman, the Islamic Union official in charge of foreign relations in Europe and the United States, has admitted that fighting is still continuing but denied that houses and installations in the city have been destroyed or any inhabitants or mosque imams have been arrested. [passage omitted]

The spokesman pointed out that prisoners held by the Islamic Union had managed to escape and reach Djibouti recently. They had told the Islamic relief and development agency that over 40 foreign experts were among those who attacked the city. The prisoners had confirmed that the experts held Sudanese, Afghan, Egyptian, and Yemeni passports, were able to use advanced weapons, and had led military operations during the attack on Laas Qoray. [passage omitted]

Homeland Leaders Hold 'Summit' on Talks

News Conference on Agreement

*MB2909170592 Johannesburg Radio South Africa
Network in English 1600 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Excerpts] President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana, Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi of Kwa-Zulu, and Brigadier Oupa Gqozo of Ciskei, have rejected Saturday's agreement between the government and the ANC [African National Congress]. The three leaders decided at talks in Mmatlatho to call an urgent meeting of other leaders, parties and organizations, which share their concern about the agreement. Addressing a news conference, they said there was great public concern that the bilateral agreement included matters which affected all parties in the country. They said that although they respected the rights of parties, they objected to their exclusion from decision-making meetings which directly affected them.

President Mangope said that by concluding the agreement the South African Government had capitulated to the ANC. The ANC had made no concessions and had undertaken only to reconsider its mass action campaign.

Dr. Buthelezi accused the government and the ANC of having agreed on a strategy of what he termed ethnic cleansing of the Zulu minority. [passage omitted]

Brigadier Gqozo accused the ANC of conducting a reign of terror, and the South African Government of trying to satisfy ANC and SACP [South African Communist Party] ideologies, and not the views of the broader South Africa. He said the South African Government has made a mockery of multiparty negotiations by committing itself to unacceptable constitutional proposals.

Agreement Rejected

*MB2909142092 Johannesburg SABA in English
1405 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Pretoria Sept 28 SABA—Three homeland leaders on Tuesday rejected the bilateral "record of understanding" entered into by the government and the African National Congress [ANC] at the weekend.

Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] President and kwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Bophuthatswana President Lucas Mangope and Ciskei military ruler Brig Oupa Gqozo in a joint communique after talks in Mmatlatho, Bophuthatswana, said it had been decided to call a meeting as soon as possible call with other leaders, parties and organisations sharing their concerns to "discuss the way forward".

"While we accept the right of all parties to enter into bilateral discussions with any other party, we object to decisions being made in bilateral discussions which impact on others not involved in the decision making."

Widespread concern at general political developments had led to the "urgent" meeting between the three leaders and their delegations, the statement said.

"Issues of great concern were discussed, and it was decided to call for the rejection of the bilateral 'record of understanding' between the South African Government and the ANC."

Ciskei Ruler's Address

*MB2909172792 Johannesburg SABA in English
1658 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Mmatlatho Sept 29 SABA—The "record of understanding" between the government and the African National Congress [ANC] supported the Ciskei's belief of collusion between the two parties, the homeland military ruler, Brig Oupa Gqozo, said on Tuesday.

Addressing the "summit meeting of moderate leaders" in the Bophuthatswana capital of Mmatlatho, together with Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Bophuthatswana President Lucas Mangope, Brig Gqozo said the summit should reject the agreement.

He also objected to the government's attempts to discuss matters of national significance with only one other party—"purporting to make decisions which had the perceived effect of binding all other parties".

These decisions and agreements influenced the future of many South Africans who did not conform to communist and ANC ideologies, or SA Government complacency.

It also overrode the interests and positions of other political organisations, he said. The Ciskei had earlier this year appealed to State President F.W. de Klerk to make sure that in the process of maintaining the negotiating momentum it should not fall into the error of "treating friends as enemies and enemies as friends".

Brig Gqozo questioned the government's repeated pandering to the demands of the ANC/SA Communist Party alliance, and the compromising of its security forces.

He also wanted to know why the government had failed to "turn its back" on mass action.

In addition, Brig Gqozo said, the government had made a mockery of the country's multiparty negotiations by committing itself to constitutional proposals which were "unacceptable to us".

He called on the meeting to reject the agreement, to demand the disbandment of the ANC military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation], to compel it to hand over arms caches, and to reject the imposition of an interim government or constituent assembly.

Brig Gqozo said it should also be ensured that the growing interference by the international community

was not intended to transfer power to the ANC with total disregard for moderate leaders.

He believed the Mmabatho meeting would prove to be the turning point in a time dominated by political compromise and agreement unacceptable to a silent majority of concerned South Africans.

De Klerk Reaction

*MB2909181792 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network
in English 1800 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Reacting to today's talks in Mmabatho the state president said he welcomed people talking to each other as this clarified political issues. What was needed more than anything else was contact between the two major groups, who were at odds with each other.

[Begin de Klerk recording] What we really need in this country is that the two parties against, [pauses] between whom there are aggressive tension—it's the ANC [African National Congress] and the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party], in Natal and in areas of the Witwatersrand—much of the violence, not all the violence stem from this conflict. And I would like to see the leadership of the ANC and the leadership of the IFP talk to each other, to make peace. That will make a tremendous contribution to make South Africa safe for all its people. [end recording]

Pik Botha Comments

*MB2909132692 Johannesburg SABA in English
1309 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Pretoria Sept 29 SABA—Political leaders should not be forming power blocs and should act in the best interests of the country, Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha said in Pretoria on Tuesday.

He was responding to a question at a news conference whether the meeting of three homeland leaders in Mmabatho on Tuesday pointed to the emergence of a conservative alliance against the African National Congress [ANC] and the National Party [NP].

Mr. Botha said the agreement reached at the weekend between the ANC and the government was not "aimed at any other party, but at resolving obstacles that were in the way of the resumption of talks."

The agreement, which had made it possible to resume negotiations, also opened the way for other parties to resume talks on their constitutional proposals.

Mr. Botha hoped the government could discuss this soon with Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] leader and kwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who cancelled a meeting with President F.W. de Klerk on Tuesday to attend the Mmabatho meeting also attended by Ciskei leader Brig Oupa Gqozo and Bophuthatswana President Lucas Mangope.

Mr. Botha also thought the government could resolve the differences it had with Mr. Mangope, who met Mr. de Klerk on Monday.

"It had never been intended on Saturday that the ANC and the government should make a deal all by themselves," Mr. Botha said.

The agreement reached on Saturday had been in line with what the UN Security Council had urged.

Mr. Botha warned that if the political ructions did not end the stage might be reached where the world's industrialised nations might say: "Goodbye, we've had enough of you... Mess it up as you please."

This was the danger facing the country "if we don't end our squabbles, our suspicions and our distrust".

Further Botha Comment

*MB2909184792 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network
in English 1800 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Foreign Minister Pik Botha said the government was not against the talks in Mmabatho or possible bloc forming. Speaking in Pretoria just before a meeting with the OAU delegation, he said every political leader had the right to hold discussions with whomever he wanted to.

[Begin Botha recording] I can only hope that individual parties who form blocs would not do so on the wrong premises, on departing from a point of view which may not be correct at all, and apportioning blame, or adopting an interpretation which was never intended. [end recording]

Mr. Botha stressed that the agreement reached on Saturday between the ANC [African National Congress] and the government was not aimed at any other party. He said it was intended to remove obstacles in the way of the resumption of talks. Mr. Botha said he hoped that the agreement could soon be discussed with Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

[Begin Botha recording] I think at follow-up meetings we will be able, just as happened on Saturday, to persuade these other important leaders that it's in the interest of all of us to come now to the talks, with an open mind, and there to wrestle with one another, to exchange views, and out of these discussions to eventually produce a constitution tailored to South Africa's interests. [end recording]

Joint Communiqué Issued

*MB2909195892 Johannesburg SABA in English
1905 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[SAPA PR wire Service issued by: Dixon Soule Associates, media consultants for the government of

Bophuthatswana, on behalf of the Department of Information: "Joint communique issued at Mmabatho on 29 September 1992"]

[Text] There is profound concern of the southern African public resulting from the bilateral agreement dealing with issues which impact on all other parties, reached on 26 September 1992 between the RSA Government and the ANC [African National Congress].

While we accept the right of all parties to enter into bilateral discussions with any other party, we object to decisions being made in bilateral discussions which impact on others not involved in the decision making.

There has been widespread concern at the general political development reflected in extensive representation made by a wide spectrum of the southern African public, which has led to an urgent meeting between: President L.M. Mangope of Bophuthatswana Brig. O.J. Gqozo of Ciskei and Dr. M.G. Buthelezi of kwaZulu and their respective delegations.

Issues of great concern were discussed, and it was decided to call for the rejection of the bilateral "record of understanding" between the South African Government and the ANC.

It was further decided that a meeting and organisations sharing these concerns and to discuss the way forward.

Buthelezi Address

*MB3009064092 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1856 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by: Office of the President of the Inkatha Freedom Party: "The Record of Understanding Signed by Mr. F.W. de Klerk and Dr. Nelson Mandela: An Inkatha Freedom Party Assessment" by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, president of Inkatha Freedom Party and chief minister of kwaZulu Mmabatho: 29 September 1992]

[Text] Your Excellency, President Mangope, I am sure that I express the appreciation of everybody here when I thank you for hosting this meeting. We needed urgently to consult with each other about where we go to from here, and this gathering of leaders today will give us the opportunity to compare notes and find common ground on crucial national issues. I want particularly to thank you, sir, for agreeing to rearrange your day to make an early start possible.

The signing of the record of understanding by Mr. de Klerk and Dr. Mandela has served notice on us that Mr. de Klerk and Dr. Mandela think that they can decide upon the parameters of negotiations unilaterally and then get us to fill out the flesh of the body politic they have decided on.

We say no to this. We know of no revolutionary movement in the history of the world which has drawn up a constitution which enables parties opposed to it to win

an election and form a government. The ANC [African National Congress] will prove to be no exception.

If we permit the agreement reached between Mr. de Klerk and Dr. Mandela to stand as binding on us, the South African Government and the ANC would feed on the South African body politic for their own destructive glory.

That is how strongly I feel. If we are ever going to have a democracy in this country we will have to stand firm in our conviction that only multi-party negotiations will help us do so. I say that if Mr. de Klerk and Dr. Mandela are so convinced that their agreement is good for South Africa, they would have no hesitation in putting themselves and their agreement at the mercy of a national multi-party conference of review. That is what we should, I think, end up calling for.

I would like to suggest that we face such grave issues that it would behove us to concentrate our minds on the fundamental issues that are at stake and to reach agreement firstly on why we reject the record of understanding, secondly on the electoral issues we face, and thirdly on a common approach to the drafting of a constitution.

The Record of Agreement

On September 26, 1992 the government and the ANC signed a record of understanding to seal a long process of bi-lateral negotiations which first developed at the margins of Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa], the official multilateral negotiating forum, and eventually took its place.

This agreement is the peak of a much deeper and broader agreement between the government and the ANC on how to share South Africa. The carefully selected words of this agreement should be read in the light of a broader understanding of what is happening, and of what are their plans for our future. In this light, the comparison of this agreement with the nefarious Von Ribbentrop/Molotov agreement between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union is not out of place.

The Von Ribbentrop/Molotov agreement between the ANC and the government sets forth the following points, which are to be read as broad policy statements governing their united action in the future:

1. Multi-lateral negotiations on the constitution will resume but will be directed and supported by extensive bi-lateral negotiations. This is a commitment to continue to hijack the negotiation process.
2. Two key issues of the constitutional negotiation process are resolved in the agreement, and therefore are likely to be removed from the agenda of multi-lateral negotiations: the constitution drafting body and the constitution drafting process. These issues have prejudicial importance on many of the other constitutional

issues such as the form of state, the principles of representation, the nature and guarantee of the constitution, et cetera. Most likely these issues will also be removed from the multi-lateral agenda as soon as the "extensive bi-lateral negotiations" between the ANC and the government will resolve them.

3. The two parties agree to a strategy of ethnic cleansing of the uncomfortable and politically vociferous Zulu minority and what they perceive as their political expression, the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]. The tools of this operation are intimidation and provocation, the tactic is the planned escalation of the confrontation.

A constitution is the result of a process of development and negotiations, and its characteristics are likely to resemble the characteristics of such a process. With the Von Ribbentrop/Molotov agreement the process of development and negotiation has buried the ideal of pluralism, whether it is social or cultural pluralism. In a bi-lateral, totalitarian and behind-the-scene fashion, the agreement went to the core of the constitutional negotiations, and imposed a solution which is the least likely to produce results respectful and protective of cultural and social pluralism.

Everything is the result of its causes. A plebiscitarian constituent assembly elected in a climate of intimidation and violence on the basis of principles of electoral law which will not reflect a federal and regional structure for the state is doomed to produce a centralized and totalitarian state which eliminates pluralism. However, only pluralism, as territorial, social, economic and cultural pluralism, is our guarantee for democracy and freedom in South Africa.

A constitution is a legal document which organises and determines powers. The South African Constitution should only organise the limited powers of the South African federal government, respecting the general powers of the member states, of the individuals and of social and economic formations, such as universities, families, churches, trade unions, private associations, et cetera. However a constituent assembly vested with the power of electoral suffrage, will not feel bound to follow any principle. As any other body, it will claim the greatest amount of power possible, and will draft a constitution which will bring under its scope and will organise the greatest amount of powers possible.

The political characterization of this constituent assembly will be determined by current events, no matter how unacceptable such events are. The IFP is decimated by daily violence. Its leadership has been exterminated by a continuous and well planned course of assassinations and is yet to be replaced. In this climate the other two highly armed political formations of South Africa intend to call general elections to decide the rules of the game. On the contrary, because of this climate the rules of the game must be decided prior to calling a general election.

The record of understanding intends to support the violence and the continuous string of assassinations with a very effective governmental action of genocide and disintegration of the ties which hold together one of the largest political formation of South Africa.

This action will be based on intimidation and provocation. This well-tested combination of tools has the power to ensure an escalation in the level of violence so as to justify more massive actions of armed genocide and ethnic cleansing.

The cornerstone of this approach is spelled out in the Von Ribbentrop/Molotov agreement. The steps which will follow the one spelled out in the agreement are easily imaginable, and will be taken as a reaction to the course of events which the first steps intend to generate.

The Zulu ethnic minority is the only major social formation in South Africa which is not armed. Both the white minorities as well as the ANC have piled up immense hidden arsenals. Their weapons are automatic rifles, such as the AK-47, and their military support include heavy artillery and equipment. In light of this situation the record of understanding carries the commitment of the government and ANC to combine forces to take away spears and shields from the Zulus.

Cultural weapons are a sign and a token of the militancy of this ethnic group to defend its cultural and ethnic identity. They are a tool of self-identification as a minority, and a reminder of their ethnic roots and history. They are not weapons, as weapons are understood in the modern world, and their primary purpose is not to cause injury to others. They can surely injure others, but so can any object if it is used for that purpose.

Taking away the cultural weapons means depriving the Zulus of their chosen and traditional tools of self-identification. It is a strategy to destroy the Zulu ethnic identity and awareness, and to intimidate them in the most militant expression of their identity. It is a well planned form of cultural castration which is meant to be received both as an intimidation and a provocation.

Similarly, the creation of Zulu concentration camps is also aimed to both intimidate and provoke a reaction. The majority of the dwellers of many hostels are Zulus and are often members of the IFP. The hostels become a "problem" because the ANC turns them into targets for their political violence. As the dwellers of the hostels learned how to react and respond to the violence, they became the centre of Zulu awareness and political identity. At that point the ANC looked for a more permanent solution aimed to destroy in mortification that Zulu awareness and sense of pride which so effectively had succeeded in reacting to the ANC's violence and intimidation. The implementation of the record of understanding will turn the hostels into places where the violation of human rights, and the oppressing sense of governmental violence are a daily part of the dweller's

lives, and this is going to prompt large-scale reactions, which in turn will justify massive killings and more direct intimidations.

This escalation will allow the government and the ANC to adopt further actions aimed to eliminate from the political process the Zulus, the IFP and any other political formation which does not fall into line.

This context and this climate will become the environment in which they will call their general elections for their constituent assembly to decide the future of our land.

In the last analysis the analogy with Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union has a limit. Once the final stages of the record of understanding will be implemented, the government will find itself with very little to claim or negotiate. At that point the agreement will look more like the agreement entered into between the lion and the sheep in Aesop's famous fable, whose moral might become South Africa's epitaph.

Either the building of pluralism is the driving force of our constitutional development process or we are all doomed, and it does not matter who goes first. A Protestant priest in Hitler's Germany noted in his diary: "When they went for the Communist I did nothing because I was not Communist; when they went for the Jews I did nothing because I was not a Jew; when they went for the Catholics I did nothing because I was not Catholic; when they came for me there was nobody left to do anything about it."

The battle for the ethnic and cultural freedom of the Zulus is a guarantee for pluralism, freedom and democracy for everybody in South Africa, and should be everybody's battle, regardless of race, colour, creed and religion.

The Electoral Issues: The IFP Position

The choice of the type of electoral principles characterises the type of democracy and the type of state in any given country.

Elections are for the purpose of providing representation. Two issues underlie all choices related to the electoral law.

1. Who and/or what is to be represented;
2. What is the purpose of the representation with relation to the body of structure to which the representative is appointed.

These two questions are two sides of the same issue. If we have a federal state and we wish to represent the states in one of the chambers of the legislature each state will send the same number of delegates, as happens in the U.S.

If we intend to represent the differences of interest and beliefs among the population and encourage local representation over the power of national parties to decide

who gets elected by manipulating the formation of the electoral lists, then the system to be chosen will be the single individual constituency. The U.S. offers a good example of such a system.

On the other hand, if we advocate a centralised and unitarian government supported by strong national parties in a system which favours the elements of communality, denying all differences in the populations, then we will favour a straight proportional system with a nationwide constituency.

The choice among different electoral techniques is always a matter of political philosophy. The elements of these choices are: formation of the electoral constituency, system of election, formation of the electoral list and the role of the political parties in the electoral process.

The political philosophy of the IFP is clear and well known. We stand for a federal system characterised by residual powers in the member states and regionalisation within each state. We believe in pluralism, personal and local autonomy and a limited role of the government in society. However, we believe that such a role is a social role, committed to helping the disadvantaged and to removing unacceptable positions of privilege.

This translates into precise choices about the electoral system. We want to ensure the representation of the people and their interest, not the representation of their affiliation to vague concepts used to aggregate people at a national level. We also want to ensure that the chosen type of representation can be used for all levels of representation, from the country level to the election of the legislator at the federal level.

We believe in and demand single individual constituencies in which anybody can run for office without the control or approval of national parties and organisations. We want to ensure that political representatives are elected through the electoral process, rather than witnessing elections which for all practical purposes elect political parties which in turn allocate their votes to the individuals they have previously chosen. For these reasons we question forms of proportional representation [PR], including list PR, STV, SNTV [expansions unknown] and mathematical formulae.

The territory must be divided by an independent electoral commission in as many constituencies as the individuals to be elected. In each constituency any person can go on the ballot provided that a limited number of voters of the constituency signs a petition asking for his or her candidacy. The individual who collects the great amount of votes is elected. There shall be a possibility to resort to the court system if there is the suspicion that the constituency has been drawn to favour any political formation. However, the constituency should be drawn so as to respect geo-political and social area so as to ensure their full representation. This system is used in the United States.

Special representation should be provided to ensure the presence in any decision-making process of interests which are not likely to be adequately represented through the electoral process, for historical or social conditions. Seats must be reserved for women and under-represented ethnic minorities. Seats can also be reserved for special interest groups and social formations which should be represented as such.

Another additional and necessary requirement of any electoral law relates to the transparency of source of financing of the political parties, limits of political contributions and equal access to all mass media. It is useless to talk about electoral systems unless there is the assurance that the election can be fair and truly democratic. Undisclosed financing should not be allowed without questioning and limits on financing should be set. And an independent commission should regulate the equal access to the mass media and ensure that the electoral debate and campaigning is fair and peaceful.

Drafting the Constitution: The IFP Position

In its constitutional proposal submitted at Codesa II, Working Group II, the IFP suggested that (A) Codesa should be the forum to produce a set of binding constitutional principles, (B) such principles are to be submitted to a referendum, and (C) once approved such principles would become the binding outline for a constitution drafting committee which would prepare a draft constitution to be submitted to the approval of the electoral body in concomitance with the first free election.

In its Codesa submission, the IFP also explained why the constitution can not be written by a constituent assembly.

The recent Von Ribbentrop/Molotov agreement between the government and the ANC seems to endorse the concept of binding principles to be handed down to a constitution drafting body, even if it indicates that such a constitution drafting body should be a constituent assembly.

Unfortunately, Codesa could not and will never be able to produce such constitutional principles. Codesa was too publicised and too politicised. The presence of political leaders and the massive press coverage made it impossible to conduct any serious constitutional talks or negotiations. The political representatives were too concerned about rendering public statements and too concerned about doing or saying anything which could compromise either the political position of their party or themselves. The discussion never left the level of generalities to go into technicalities. The result was that the real negotiation was moved to another forum: the intriguing dark alley negotiations which eventually produced the Von Ribbentrop/Molotov agreement.

The lesson of history, from the U.S. to the Namibian Constitution teaches that a constitution such as the South African Constitution can not be negotiated and

written under spot-lights. This applies to the drafting of constitutional principles as well.

The IFP suggest that South Africa follows the same negotiating process which led to the adoption of the Bretton Woods Agreement. This was an agreement which everybody considered as one impossible to reach, and which, once adopted, change the face of recent history more than any other single written piece of paper.

In fact, for years political representatives from all over the world had met and unsuccessfully discussed the creation of a coordinated international monetary system. It did not seem possible to reach any significant agreement, as no politician was willing to tie his name and fortunes to major limitations of domestic sovereignty.

It was finally decided that a group of technocrats consisting of experts in economy and finance were to meet in a secluded reserve in Breton Woods without the press, and that they were to stay there until a draft agreement was reached.

When the technocrats returned with the draft agreement, no single country dared to attack it or reject it, because they knew that they were in no position to propose an alternative.

This led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank system.

The IFP proposes that a similar methodology be followed to draft binding constitutional principles. Each party should designate its experts, and these experts should meet in a secluded and hospitable place where, in serenity and independence, they will have to negotiate and return to our nation with a final document containing all the agreed upon principles. This document will need to be approved by each political party. However, the IFP anticipates that the rejection of such a document will carry such negative political connotations that many parties will be hard pressed not to reject it.

This process will capitalise on good faith and hope, and will free the constitution drafting process from the greed and anxiety of daily and short-term politicking. After all, it is the IFP's most fundamental belief that we are not writing this constitution for ourselves with the next election in mind, but we are to be writing it for our grandchildren, with their happiness and freedom in mind.

The IFP invites all other political parties and social formations of South Africa to support this position.

Goldstone Report 'Castigates' Ciskei Troops

MB3009063292 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0549 GMT 30 Sep 92

[Text] Johannesburg Sept 30 SAPA—The Goldstone Commission report on the Bisho massacre castigates

Ciskeian troops for firing indiscriminately for a prolonged time on fleeing African National Congress (ANC) marchers—killing 29 and injuring hundreds. The commission also finds that the security forces' conduct overshadows the contravention by marchers of a magisterial order confining them to the Bisho stadium, near the border with South Africa.

The Ciskei forces' "indiscriminate and prolonged shooting at innocent demonstrators is morally and legally indefensible and is deserving of the strongest censure", says the report. "When the crowd in that area turned to flee... the continued and prolonged firing was quite unjustified and unlawful."

"The Ciskei Council of State must publicly acknowledge that members of the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) acted reprehensibly and unacceptably in reacting in a wholly disproportionate manner and causing the unnecessary deaths and injuries to people who were fleeing from them."

The findings are contained in a 36-page report handed to State President F.W. de Klerk on Tuesday [29 September] afternoon by Commission Chairman Mr. Justice Richard Goldstone and issued exclusively to SAPA on Wednesday. The commission was asked to investigate the Bisho massacre at Mr. de Klerk's request.

On September 7 hundreds of homeland troops opened fire without warning on thousands of supporters of the ANC and its alliance partners, when a group of demonstrators led by senior official Ronnie Kasrils ran through an opening in a fence around the Bisho stadium, towards the Ciskei capital. A Ciskei chief magistrate had only hours earlier granted permission for marchers to enter the homeland on condition they confined themselves to the Bisho stadium between 12 noon and 4.30PM, and that they did not carry any dangerous weapons.

The commission report, which was completed in the record time of one week due mainly to the existence of video material of the day's events and the presence of independent observers, made eight recommendations in total.

Two were that the Ciskei attorney-general should investigate charges against "any person responsible for death or injury" and that the ANC should publicly censure Mr. Kasrils and others who had exposed marchers to the danger of death and injury. But, the report stated, "whatever criticism may be levelled at the organisation of the demonstration and whatever criticism there may be of the decision to lead the demonstrators through the gap in the fence, they cannot in any way justify or excuse the conduct of the Ciskei soldiers. That conduct was so disproportionate and deliberate that, on the CDF's version, any mitigating factors there may have been, are completely overwhelmed by the disregard for human life shown by the soldiers..."

"Anyone who has watched the videos of the shooting will have experienced a feeling of disbelief that the shooting could have continued for what appeared to be an interminable time."

On the single death of a Ciskei soldier, the four-man commission found there was a "high probability" that he was shot by one of his fellow soldiers.

Dealing specifically with Mr. Kasrils, the commission said his action was regrettable and irresponsible. "It was the immediate cause of what followed. We accept that the leaders responsible for that decision could not have anticipated the almost unbelievable response of the Ciskeian army. However, a violent response was foreseen for days before. This action by the alliance was made without any notice to the leaders of the National Peace Secretariat and was a serious breach of faith."

A broader recommendation by the commission was that leaders of the TBVC [Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei] states and of the self-governing homelands should publicly declare their willingness to tolerate and facilitate mass demonstrations where they were reasonable and negotiated. "Those in control of any region, city or town anywhere in South Africa, including the TBVC homelands, should tolerate and allow complete freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly."

"The leadership of the TBVC homelands and of the self-governing territories should forthwith publicly declare themselves willing to tolerate and facilitate reasonable and negotiated public mass demonstrations in the areas under their control. No-go areas anywhere are quite unacceptable and a barrier to any free or fair election."

On the CDF, the commission further recommended:

— "The officers commanding the CDF should immediately conduct a full inquiry into the training and discipline of their members with the intention of taking such steps as may be necessary to ensure that a recurrence of the undisciplined, unprofessional and wholly unacceptable conduct of which they were guilty on September 7 cannot recur."

The results of the inquiry and the steps to be taken should be made public.

— Under a section titled "the conduct of the alliance organisers", the report said the leaders must have been aware the Ciskei authorities were in earnest in their refusal to allow the demonstrators into the Ciskei.

ANC alliance leaders' threats in preceding days to occupy Bisho until Brig Oupa Gqozo resigned "could only have been calculated to harden the attitude of the Ciskei authorities". "In these circumstances for the alliance leaders to have approved of their followers running through the gap in the fence, in the direction of

Bisho, was irresponsible and deliberately placed such people in imminent danger which resulted in death and injury.

"In the present climate of negotiation in South Africa and the policy with regard thereto by all the major political parties, the decision to have risked the lives of their followers by advancing out of the stadium was unfortunate and unjustified.

"...To have deliberately withheld that intention from the National Peace Secretariat was disingenuous and rendered useless the role which was played by it."

A recommendation aimed at general mass action stated:

—"The leaders of all organisations which use forms of mass public demonstrations should do so only as a peaceful means to popularise political policies and prepropagate political changes.

"They should immediately and publicly abandon any political action calculated to result in conflict and violence. In order to avoid physical conflict and violence," the report continued, "mass demonstrations should not be used as a means of causing serious and non-temporary disturbance or as a means of direct political intimidation".

The Bisho commission members—Mr. Justice Goldstone, Vice-Chairman D.J. Rossouw, M.N.S. Sithole and L. Baqwa—ended their report "with the hope that this highly regrettable incident with the unnecessary and tragic loss of life and injury will mark a turning point and induce all political leaders and their supporters to cooperate with each other and with the National Peace Accord structures and to take such steps as may be necessary to bring peace and tranquility to our country".

ANC Said Split Over Meet With Buthelezi

*MB3009080192 Umtata Capital Radio in English
0500 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[Text] The ANC [African National Congress] meets today to consider a meeting with Inkatha Leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi. The government is involved in a separate all-out bid to woo the kwaZulu chief back to talks. John Matham reports:

[Matham] The ANC is reportedly in two camps over the advisability of the leadership summit between the ANC and Inkatha. Some members of the organization's National Executive Committee believe the ANC can hold the meeting because of its present political strength. Others, reportedly including Nelson Mandela, are less willing to hold face-to-face with Buthelezi. That's because of the stream of anti-ANC invective issued by Buthelezi recently.

The government is also expected to suggest a high profile meeting with Inkatha over the next few weeks. The government's tactic will be to emphasize the importance of Buthelezi and the IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] to

negotiations, but does not mean that government will be prepared to accept an IFP veto.

ANC Says Strydom Release Not Part of Accord

*MB2909091892 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0821 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[SAPA PR Wire Service issued by African National Congress: "Press Statement on Misrepresentation Over Release of Barend Strydom"]

[Text] There has been a blurring of information and a deliberate presentation by sections of the mass media that the release of Barend Strydom was part of the agreement on release of political prisoners reached between the ANC [African National Congress] and the government.

The ANC has painstakingly, in cooperation with bodies such as the Human Rights Commission as well as local structures, compiled a list of prisoners sentenced for actions in opposition to apartheid.

Barend Strydom was not on that list. His crime was cold-blooded, premeditated murder founded on racial hatred. Black people were "the enemy", and in the run-up to his Pretoria killing spree, he had a "trial run" in which one woman was murdered. Rehabilitation was considered impossible by the presiding judge. Therefore the government must be held accountable for any future atrocities Strydom might commit.

Strydom is most certainly a product of apartheid policies. The ANC was not party to the decision to release Strydom. The responsibility for this rests squarely on the shoulders of the government. It is their decision to accept that such heinous crimes were committed in defence of apartheid, and fall within their definition of a legitimate political act.

The continual comparison made between Strydom and Robert McBride is not only without foundation, but is also an insult to those who have steadfastly opposed racism. The millions of people who have lived their whole lives under the yoke of apartheid reject with contempt this odious comparison.

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P.O. Box 61884, Marshalltown 2107, Johannesburg.

CP Leader Rejects De Klerk-Mandela Agreements

*MB2809160892 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1535 GMT 28 Sep 92*

[Text] Pretoria Sept 28 SAPA—Conservative Party [CP] leader Andries Treurnicht on Monday called on political role players to reject the "record of understanding" between the government and the African National Congress [ANC].

He said in a statement Sunday President F.W. de Klerk had finally capitulated to interim government as demanded by the ANC at the expense of all other role players.

"Caving in to overseas and ANC/SACP [South African Communist Party] pressures, which resulted in such disastrous concessions and the release of murderers and bombers, is much too high a price for continued negotiations with the ANC," Dr. Treurnicht said.

Welcoming the objections by Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] President Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Ciskei Leader Brigadier Oupa Gqozo against the agreements reached between Mr. de Klerk and ANC leader Nelson Mandela, he said South Africa's future and the destiny of its peoples could not be decided bilaterally by the government and the ANC.

"The banning of traditional weapons, whilst permitting the ANC to operate numerous concealed arms caches, is unacceptable duplicity," Dr. Treurnicht said.

He said the Transvaal congress of the CP had unanimously agreed that the installation of an interim government would be tantamount to a declaration of war.

"The time has come for joint action by those who refuse to live under ANC/SACP tyranny or betrayal by the government," Dr. Treurnicht said.

30 September Press Review of Current Events, Issues MB3009130792

[Editorial Report]

THE STAR

Buthelezi's 'Perilous Course'—The 30 September Johannesburg THE STAR in English in a page 16 editorial entitled "A dangerous manoeuvre" says "Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is on a perilous course." The paper says his withdrawal from constitutional negotiations will not help resolve South Africa's problems, but may aggravate them. "There are signs already that his withdrawal has encouraged the formation of a separatist front between Kwazulu, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei." The meeting between Chief Buthelezi, President Mangosuthu, and Brigadier Oupa Gqozo "is a clear indication of a new and dangerous political trend." THE STAR says the "threat of secession is in the air," and that is "an incendiary word, even when whispered" in a heterogeneous society like South Africa. "Chief Buthelezi and his allies must somehow be brought back to the negotiating table." The paper notes that "so far President de Klerk has reacted with admirable restraint," though partly because of his need for Buthelezi in "his envisaged grand alliance of 'moderate' forces." It concludes that the African National Congress "however, must help by ending its propaganda onslaught on selected 'bantustans' and by abandoning its plans to march on Mmabatho and Ulundi."

SOWETAN

Debate on Prisoner Release—In its first editorial, the 30 September Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on page 8 notes that the prisoner release "is causing a lot of debate." It sees this as good since it encourages "philosophical analysis of political matters." The paper says the African National Congress demands arose from its "ineffectual and weak" involvement at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa. It notes that the release was part of a negotiated package with the government that "has thrown another spanner in the works" with the withdrawal of the Inkatha Freedom Party from the talks. The paper says President de Klerk "had no alternative but to go this route." The SOWETAN finds the release of "mass killer Strydom" "extremely difficult to accept." It concludes that in the negotiations process ahead, it is inevitable that "unpalatable compromises will have to be swallowed."

* SAP's Special Task Force Training Described

92AF1255E Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English
23 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Peta Krost]

[Text] When the going gets tough, the Special Task Force [STF] gets going. The SAP's [South African Police] equivalent of America's SWAT [Special Weapons and Tactics] teams is trained to face situations ranging from explosives to armed conflict and hostage dramas.

But ask any member of the squad what his worst experience has been, and he'll almost certainly say the six-month training course that put him in the team.

More than 100 recruits failed to complete the most recent course, which ended last month.

Of the 137 who started out, only 21 finally made it.

Sergeant Marcel Lyle, 25, one of the graduates, said: "I had no idea what was in store when I volunteered. I knew it would be tough, but I had no idea how tough.

"There were many times when I had doubts that I would survive the course.

"Within two hours of the course starting people began to drop out."

Marches

Task force operation commander Major Mike Fryer said: "We push them to the limit. We have to if we want to ensure they meet the requirements of the top task force in South Africa."

In the first few weeks after selection, recruits do route marches of up to 50km a night, PT sessions that would break the toughest gym freaks, including 120 push-ups in two minutes and running 5km in 20 minutes, and navigate obstacle courses designed to probe every possible weakness and phobia.

They are subjected to ongoing psychological tests to assess their performance under stress and receive intensive training in arms, explosives, counter-insurgency, hostage situations, rescue techniques, parachuting and first aid.

The task force was founded after the Fox Street siege in 1975, when David Protter took hostages in the Israeli consulate in Johannesburg.

General Blackjack de Swardt, head of emergency services and one of the founders of the STF, said: "We realised then that we didn't have the expertise to deal with the situation adequately, so we decided to form a squad that could handle anything."

The longest-serving member of the STF is Warrant-Officer George Archer, 40, who was in the second intake and has been in the squad for 15 years.

"I suppose I could do the selection course again, but I wouldn't want to. It was a personal challenge for me to get through," he said.

"The advantage of our training is that more often than not we don't have to resort to violence. Our objective is to achieve maximum results with minimum force," he said.

The men in the 80-strong squad are on 24-hour call and no matter where they are or what they are doing, when a call comes in they react within seconds.

Trust

They have an extremely close relationship with one another. When they are not reacting to calls, the men spend their entire day, every day, training.

"Even if we have differences on the personal front, we know we can trust each other implicitly—that's the nature of our work," said W/O Archer.

Among the situations the STF has dealt with in recent years were the siege of the Silverton branch of Volkskas in the late 70s and the freeing of a busload of pilgrims taken hostage during Pope John Paul II's visit to Lesotho in 1988.

Two months ago, a man in the Pretoria suburb of La Montagne was prevented from committing suicide after his neighbours called the police.

The STF broke down the door to his flat and disarmed him.

On November 13 last year, in a joint operation with members of the Witwatersrand Robbery Reaction Unit, the task force freed staff members held hostage during an armed robbery at the Anderson Street branch of First National Bank (FNB) in Johannesburg.

While the reaction unit circled the building, 12 task force members were lowered on to the building from three police helicopters to catch the robbers unawares.

Four of the five would-be robbers were shot by police minutes before FNB staff, including a pregnant woman, were rescued unharmed.

* New Security Measures for Train Commuters

92AF1255D Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*
in English 21 Aug 92 p 7

[Article by Bernie van Niekerk: "Ensuring Safety on Trains to Cost R250m"]

[Text] About R250-million [rands] will be spent during the 1992-1993 financial year to improve safety on South Africa's trains, South Africa Rail and Commuter Corporation (SARCC) MD [managing director] Wynand Burger told a media gathering last week.

Steps already taken by the SARCC to safeguard commuters include the increase of Spoornet security officials countrywide; upgrading of 65 stations to effect better policing and the streamlining of SAP [South African Police] deployment at commuter stations.

In addition, prototype coaches with new safety features should be ready for testing in the near future. Should these be viable, the bulk of trains used on the Soweto lines will be modified at an estimated cost of R11.2-million.

A proposed Commuter Corporation Rail Guard, recruited from the community, will initially be limited to southern Transvaal at a cost of \$38.75-million; when fully implemented it will cost an additional R200-million a year.

About R25-million is required for upgrading SAP facilities at stations countrywide. For the current financial year, R1-million will be spent on the replacement of existing Zozo huts plus an extra R2-million for additional buildings.

In the current budget, R11-million has been allocated to on-board, communication systems between train drivers and controllers, as well as security centres.

In addition, R7-million has been earmarked for on-board public address systems as well as communication systems at stations.

Burger reported that the layout of stations was receiving attention. Entrance control points will be moved outside the station building.

The intention is to provide overhead bridges in order to separate the public from the commuters at stations in the Soweto area, he said.

This, together with improving the control points, will cost an additional R17-million in this financial year.

The SARCC will also improve the exit and access control of third class commuters at the Cape Town station, at a cost of R2-million.

Facilities to allow for body searches at 168 stations in the southern Transvaal region, at an estimated cost of R4-million, are to be built.

To improve ticket controlling, a further 330 controllers will have to be employed in the southern Transvaal region alone. This will cost an extra R5-million for a portion of the current financial year.

But whether the SARCC will be able to implement these measures depends on its financial resources.

Although R134-million has already been approved, the corporation is awaiting ministerial approval of an additional R28-million for the operating budget.

An outstanding amount of R88-million still has to be requested from the government, of which R38.75-million will be operating and R49.25-million capital.

Prototype Security Train Shaping Up Near Pretoria

The South African Rail Commuter Corporation is spending a portion of its R250-million budget on developing two prototype trains fitted with "sophisticated security measures."

The "5M2A" 14-coach trains will feature both radio and closed circuit television equipment, costing an estimated R500,000 for each train.

The trains, taking shape at Koedoespoort just north of Pretoria, will be equipped with "unbreakable" windows, "intelligent" doors, intercommunicating coaches, integrated communications systems, microprocessor controlled systems and video surveillance.

Development engineer of rolling stock at the SARCC, Brian Carver, says the design is oriented firstly towards commuter and equipment safety and then towards identifying perpetrators of violence.

The video surveillance systems, supplied by Teljoy Business Systems and LS Turnkey, comprise hidden cameras which will inform the operator of the "state of the nation" on the four motor and 10 passenger coaches.

Four cameras on each coach, hidden behind polycarbonate panels, will transmit visuals to a quad-split monitor in the operator's compartment, from where control rooms can be altered and security forces called in by radio.

Future plans include a control room, with 24 hour "alert" surveillance, to monitor all the trains and stations at once, says Carver.

Communication, also to be facilitated by an onboard PA system, is the key to preventing violence on trains.

The train doors, when closing, now sound an alarm which gets louder should someone try to keep the door open.

This, together with a new latching facility, should prevent passengers from being thrown off, says Carvers.

Polycarbonate windows, aptly named "hoppers", are able to deflect rocks and possibly small calibre bullets.

The prototypes are expected to be completed by March 1993 with evaluation and implementation following shortly thereafter.

* Need To Transform Security Forces Examined

92AF1255B Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS
in English Sep 92 pp 15-17

[Article by Rockland Williams: "Changing the Guard?"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Following the Boipatong massacre, the Democratic Movement is at last beginning to give security issues the serious attention it deserves. However, the movement needs to think bigger than mere control over the security establishment and the integration of previously warring structures in the interim period.

Control and integration may not radically alter the culture, political orientation and balance of power in the transition. Complete restructuring is required to achieve the goal of an accountable and representative security community.

This should embrace national security strategy and security structures; the roles, missions and organisational culture of the security establishment; the professional ethos and ethical basis of intelligence, policing and soldiering; and the racial imbalance within the various organs of the security community.

Basis for Future Defence Force

Although mechanisms of control continue to be the bone of contention, there is some agreement—between senior MK [Umkhonto we Sizwe—Spear of the Nation] commanders, senior ex-SADF [South African Defense Force] officers, serving SADF Citizen Force officers, senior officer corps of most TVBC [Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei] armies, establishment and progressive defence institutes plus a variety of major political groupings—over the principles which should govern a future defence force:

- a defence force subordinate to parliament that will respect the principles of civil supremacy;
- a civilian defence ministry that will have direct political control over the defence force;
- the primary role of a future defence force to be confined to a conventional military brief;
- a defence force excluded from an internal policing role;
- a new defence force to be created out of both the personnel and traditions of the existing armed forces—the SADF, MK, the TVBC armies and possibly other para-military formations;
- a future defence force that enjoys legitimacy in the

eyes of the country's people;

- a redefinition of 'professionalism'—a thorough retraining programme for all military personnel is recommended;
- confidence-building measures between the different armies to facilitate the process of restructuring and integration;
- an affirmative action programme to be implemented to ensure that a future defence force accurately reflects the gender, national, regional and racial composition of South Africa.

However, key differences and unexplored issues continue to stall the creation of a legitimate and representative defence force.

Modalities of Operational Control

During the transition the real battle in the defence debate will be waged around the forms of political and operational control over the armed forces.

The SADF's technocratic obsession with its 'professionalism' reflects a far more naked concern: the preservation of institutional privileges.

Consider the measures being proposed by the democratic movement for the transition. These can be divided into formal and informal mechanisms of operational control.

Proposed formal measures include:

- the introduction of an international monitoring presence—not to be confused with an international peace-keeping presence—to oversee the activities of the security forces during the transition. Whether implemented at a symbolic level (a few thousand international monitors) or a substantial level (20-30,000 personnel), such a presence will inhibit the armed forces from pursuing their own agenda and institute impartial accountability over their actions.
- the creation of a joint command council (or similar structure) to oversee the activities of the SADF, MK and the TVBC armies. Such a body will serve as a basis for confidence-building measures between the different armed forces, but will also ensure a measure of executive control over the personnel and equipment of the respective formations. It will also provide the initial basis for integration.
- disbanding special forces (SF) regiments and restructuring the brief of military intelligence (MI). The justification for the retention of SF and MI unites hardly exists in a country facing a vastly reduced international, regional and domestic military threat scenario.
- the right of the soldier to full constitutional rights such as recourse to the civilian courts, protection via a code of conduct and the right to vote and belong to a political party.

Informal mechanisms of operational control include measures to curb the abilities of the officer corps, or sections therein, to influence the political process.

The numerical and technical dynamics of the integration process will limit the ability of the SADF officer corps (who will undoubtedly remain influential within a future defence force in the short to medium-term) to use the armed forces in support of covert and controversial military projects. This process will restrain sectors of the SADF from interfering in the political process and from supporting partisan interests both regionally and nationally.

An ongoing democratisation process should include: a redefinition of professionalism, the disciplinary codes and offensive nature of the armed forces; and a weeding out of racially and ethnically determined practices within present military culture.

A future recruitment debate (voluntary service versus conscription) will challenge the monopoly over the combat and operational musters presently held by white conscripts. A voluntary system of service (whether professional, part-time or both) will ensure greater representativeness.

Police and Spies

In the long term, the restructuring of the military culture of the armed forces—its strategic doctrine, its disciplinary culture, its ethnic and racial traditions—will be the most powerful factor restraining the corporate ambitions of sectors of its officer corps. The whole process could take more than a decade to accomplish.

It is also important to consider mechanisms of control over other members of the security establishment. The scenario regarding control over the South African Police (SAP) remains much bleaker than facing the armed forces—although there are more African, coloured and Indian members of the SAP than there are in the SADF (60 percent in the SAP vs 52 percent in the SADF).

The reasons for this include the strategic and political direction of the SAP's present command echelons, the social backgrounds of white SAP personnel, and the largely or exclusively white composition of its key branches (i.e., Criminal Intelligence Services, Riot Squad and CID [Criminal Investigation Department]).

Unlike the military, where a large standing body of non-SADF military personnel is awaiting integration—drawn mainly from the ranks of the TVBC armies and MK—the SAP only really faces integration with the numerically inferior homeland police forces. Unlike the homeland armies—some of whose officers and rank-and-file have displayed a progressive political orientation—the homeland police force are mostly known for their conservatism, thuggery and brutality.

It might be easier to restructure and control the National Intelligence Service (NIS) than the SAP. The urban

membership, its civilian ethos and its academic orientation makes it more receptive to theories of accountability than the militarised sectors of the security establishment.

National Co-ordinating Mechanism....

The democratic movement has ignored crucial aspects of security force restructuring in its recent debates and demands, relating to the activities and mechanisms of control over the National Co-ordinating Mechanism (NCM, formerly known as the National Security Management System [NSMS]).

The continued existence of the NCM shows the state is being less than honest in its pursuit of the negotiating process. The NCM does not differ much from the NSMS. Although there has been an executive demilitarisation of the NCM by De Klerk, its strategic orientation remains within the framework of classic counter-insurgency strategy.

Also, the structures of the NCM at a local, district and regional level have remained virtually unaltered.

Although there has been a partial re-orientation towards a welfare brief, these structures are still dominated by the Joint Security Committees (JSCs) and the Joint Intelligence Centres (JICs).

What is the evidence to suggest this?

On 25 September 1989, the State Security Council (SSC), with De Klerk in the chair, issued an instruction to the Work Committee of the SSC to investigate and make recommendations on the workings of the NSMS. The reasons for this revision, De Klerk stated, were the unnecessary duplication of departmental activities by the NSMS, the hours wasted on NSMS meetings, and the international perception that the state under P.W. Botha was, de facto, a military state.

On 15 November 1989, the Commission of Enquiry delivered its report to the Cabinet and the following measure were adopted. Four Cabinet Committees were created: Constitutional Affairs; Economic Affairs; Welfare Affairs and Security Affairs. The SSC was replaced with a Committee of Departmental Heads. Its responsibility was to ensure interdepartmental coordination in the execution of national security strategy. A new security committee (the NCM) was formed to coordinate security activities at a national, regional and local level.

Executive authority has been provided to this committee through the creation of a Joint Security Staff consisting of senior officers from the SADF, SAP and NIS. It has responsibility for the execution and overseeing of all security force operations.

....Still Pursues 'Counter-Insurgency'

Yet, despite this shift towards the control and civilianisation of the executive reaches of the security pyramid, the regional, district and local levels of the NCM

remained unchanged. Joint Management Centres were simply renamed Joint Coordinating Centres and the same division of labour within their structures persisted—Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint Security Committee, Strategic Communications Committee and Welfare Committees.

The manual upon which state security strategy is based—the State War Book or 'Administration Total War'—remains virtually unaltered.

In certain areas—particularly the Northern Transvaal—the SADF structures within the NCM are now trying to win 'hearts and minds' among the local population using newly created black battalions (117 and 118 Infantry Battalions) rather than white troops to accomplish this mission.

The stated goal of their strategy is to counter 'revolutionary activity' in the area and they have created a new military HQ with the purpose of coordinating these efforts in the area (Group 45 HQ based in Pietersburg). Troops are being used to distribute literature, food and services in an attempt to curb the influence of 'insurrectionist' tendencies.

Democratic Demands....

The democratic movement must demand the following:

- Complete transparency of structures and strategies of the NCM. If negotiations are to be characterised by 'good faith', then the retention of clandestine and covert counter-insurgency structures is a violation of this commitment.
- Disbanding or restructuring of the NCM network.
- The revision of the entire national security strategy upon which the present state predicates its security policy.

With the demise of the Cold War and in the light of regional and domestic developments, it is important to move beyond the narrow confines of traditional security strategy. A new approach to security strategy should seek to emphasise the socio-economic, developmental, psychological and regional dynamics of security strategy.

Security can be sought through a sustained effort to allay the insecurities of people on the ground (hunger; poverty; illiteracy; violence and so on).

These structures, integral to the total strategy, have operated particularly in the rural areas. The Group HQ and Commando system, for example, provide the structural basis for the Joint Intelligence Committee network of the NCM.

The continued retention of the NCM—and any other covert counter-insurgency structures—remains a vivid testimony of the extent to which the state is continuing to pursue a double agenda.

....Are Not Unrealistic

These demands are not unrealistic in either political or military terms. Joint control and integration will prevent the chaos and lack of control that will confront a defence establishment that is politically and militarily divided (the action of the SAP in Boipatong being a classic example).

It is ironic that despite the progress made in the negotiating process, the SADF has still not sat down with the other military forces in a military Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa]. The inflexibility of the SADF on these issues raises doubts about its—or at least that of its dominant factions—genuine commitment to the transition in general.

Although the consensus that emerged around the principles of a future defence force is an encouraging sign, it should be borne in mind that the parameters of future civil-military relations will be determined, to a great extent, within the womb of present civil-military relations.

Important issues relating to restructuring of and operational control over the armed forces cannot be allowed to pass undebated. These demands should not be diluted by the democratic movement and should be further refined and developed in the future.

The democratic movement should not underestimate the extent of the support that exists within the difficult armed forces for both these proposals and desired mechanisms.

Not only must the democratic movement broaden its hegemony amongst the people, but it must also broaden its influence among the soldiers themselves.

*** Causes of Violence in Vaal Triangle Explored***** Causes Enumerated**

92AF1256A Johannesburg *WORK IN PROGRESS*
in English Sep 92 pp 11-14

[Article by Kerry Cullinan and Professor Malema: "Triangle of Violence"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The Vaal Triangle has once again become South Africa's killing centre. Between January and June, 244 people were killed and 215 injured in its seven townships—Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Boipatong, Bophelong, Evaton, Orange Farm and Palm Springs. Ninety nine people died in June alone. (Human Rights Commission figures)

Over the past two years, normal life in the Vaal has been shattered. Shebeens, beerhalls, parties, vigils, taxis, trains, buses and homes have been attacked, and innocent individuals have been attacked and killed.

Why the Vaal?

It is difficult to determine exactly why those behind the violence have targeted the Vaal.

Many blame the racism that thrives in the Vaal's white towns—Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark, Meyerton and Sasolburg. UCT [University of Cape Town] academic Jeremy Seekings says the success of consumer boycotts in the Vaal's white towns is a good indication of how deeply township residents resent racism.

The Vaal police force is also to blame, not only for its maltreatment of residents, but for its racist behaviour from within.

In the last five years at least 20 suspects have died or been severely assaulted in police custody according to lawyers.

On 8 March this year, women and youth marched on Sharpeville police station to demand the withdrawal of white policemen from the township.

In the late 1980s, black municipal policemen mutinied because of the racism behaviour of some of their white colleagues according to a source. Their grievances were eventually handed to the commissioner of police.

Recently black policemen—often prompted by their wives—have initiated meetings with ANC [African National Congress] structures to denounce the violence from within the force and that imposed on Vaal residents.

As evidenced by the recent WEEKLY MAIL expose of secret police bases intended for monitoring, infiltrating and disrupting popular political organisations, the SAP [South African Police] appears determined to maintain control over the Vaal for political purposes, rather than to aggressively fight crime or violence.

Workplace Conditions

Cosatu's [Congress of South African Trade Unions] national organiser, Zwelinzima Vavi, believes that employers must also bear blame for increasing conflict. According to Vavi, many employers—particularly Iscor [South African Iron and Steel Corporation], the area's biggest employer—favour Inkatha's United Workers Union of SA (Uwusa) over Cosatu unions, as Uwusa rarely takes industrial action.

"Iscon is involved in a conspiracy against the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa)," said Vavi, who was Cosatu's Vaal regional secretary until recently. "It knows that if people are intimidated by Inkatha, they will not participate in Numsa activities and profits will tilt in Iscon's favour."

Wits University's Professor Tom Lodge believes that "structural characteristics" have played a part in the "extraordinarily high level of conflict" in the Vaal.

There is little opportunity for skilled, white-collar work. Township residents are generally either blue-collar workers, often living in hostels, or unemployed. This lack of access to opportunity has contributed to the rising township anger.

Lodge also says he suspects "political competition" plays a role in heightening tensions in the area. In the Vaal, the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] has a particularly strong presence, more so than in other areas such as the East Rand, which has similar problems.

Weak Organisation

Although the Vaal is best known as a flashpoint—the 1961 Sharpeville massacre, the 1984 uprising and the subsequent Delmas trial, and now Boipatong—the area has a history of weak organisation.

The first black local authority was set up in the Vaal as the area was considered quiet. During the 1970s, the Sebokeng local authority was seen as a "model", says Seekings.

Although the Vaal exploded in September 1984 over rent hikes, there were neither youth nor civic structures at the time. The 1984 uprising can be explained in socio-economic terms, say academics. Vaal townships were paying far higher rents than other areas as the Development Board was committed to making the area finance itself. Rent increases were introduced, during a bad local recession, by councillors who had been exposed as thoroughly corrupt.

Today ANC structures are relatively weak in the Vaal. This has been exacerbated by the violence which has made organisation-building difficult. Many of the armed youths at barricades in the townships are not accountable to any political structure, and could potentially bring anarchy to the area.

Security Force Involvement

The Vaal Civic Association's (VCA) organiser, Sello Morake, and the Vaal Council of Churches' (VCC) Human Rights desk chief, Gift Morane, both blame the covert police operations and the heavy presence of the security forces for the bulk of the violence.

A number of activists, particularly Umkhonto we Sizwe [MK-Spear of the Nation] members, have been killed by police, including:

- MK members Rangwati Lefiedi and Thabo Mosebi, who were shot dead in Sharpeville on 24 January this year;
- MK member Andries Molebatsi, who was shot dead by a municipal policeman, Sergeant 'Skuto' Marumo on 1 March. The eyewitness, Doctor Motsitsi, was found dead nine days later.
- MK member Mzwakhe Nhlapo, shot on 26 April.
- ANC member Tshepi Lengwati, suspected of killing a policeman during an attempted robbery, died in police custody on 27 January. He was shot 17 times in

the chest while handcuffed. Police claim he died when unknown attackers shot at the police vehicle he was being transported in.

The two cases in which the security forces have appointed independent inquiries after shooting incidents, seem to have merely been public relations exercises:

- After police killed five people when they fired into a Sebokeng crowd on 26 March 1990, Judge Goldstone recommended that the policemen involved be prosecuted. No action has been taken.
- Judge Stafford recommended that the SADF [South African Defense Force] members who killed four people in Sebokeng on 4 September 1990, be charged with murder and assault. He also described the SADF's internal inquiry as a "whitewash". To date, no action has been taken.

In addition to direct security force involvement, Vavi points out that police were told of planned attacks on residents in "at least eight cases since July 1990," but they failed to act.

A clear example is the 17 June Boipatong massacre. Police were called to the area by a petrol attendant, Meshack Theone, and Peace Action, but failed to act.

Dr Peter Waddington, a British criminologist assisting the Goldstone Commission, describes the police actions in the Boipatong tragedy as "woefully inadequate" and "incompetent". He also slams police for discriminating against residents in favour of hostel dwellers.

KwaMadala Nerve Centre

Most attacks on Vaal residents can be traced back to Iscor's KwaMadala hostel. Situated 2km from the nearest township, with an SADF base across the road, the hostel is effectively a fortress.

Until recently, Iscor turned a blind eye to the many unemployed people and gangsters, such as a man known as Khetis, who stayed at the hostel and were implicated in attacks on residents.

A delegation of church leaders and women met Iscor management on 15 August 1991, and asked them to stop housing "enemies of peace and life." Shortly afterwards, the parastatal published advertisements claiming that all KwaMadala occupants were Iscor employees, and there was no evidence that hostel dwellers were attacking residents.

But an unemployed KwaMadala resident this year told lawyers that he had been trained to use weapons at the hostel. The weapons—AK 47s and spears—were brought to the hostel by Inkatha members from Natal, he said.

Residents also claim that the SADF has trained some of those living at KwaMadala.

Many attacks are random. Their only apparent aim is to strike terror into residents' hearts, such as the spate of attacks on beerhalls and taverns. Between May 1991 and May this year, 17 people have been killed in attacks on Sebokeng's Kooperasie beerhall and Erica Tavern, and Sharpeville's Ha-hlo-ho-ya-peye and Chiefs Taverns.

But a number of attacks are directed at activists, particularly MK members, and their families. Cases include:

- The massacre of 39 people at a night vigil for ANC organiser Chris Nangalembe in Sebokeng on 12 January 1991.
- The murder of ANC leader Ernest Sotsu's wife, daughter and grandson on 3 July 1991.
- The massacre on 19 April this year of seven members of Rangwati Lefiedi's family in Sharpeville. Lefiedi, an MK member, had been killed in January by police (see above) [not reproduced].
- The mysterious death on 22 March of Saul Tsotetsi, SACP [South African Communist Party] PWV [Pretoria-Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] executive member and chairperson of the ANC's Evaton branch, in a hand grenade explosion.
- The death of the mother of ANCYL [African National Congress Youth League] Vaal executive member Ntswaki Smith in a hand grenade explosion.

Residents Retaliate

VCA's Morake says people have no confidence in the dispensing of justice in the country, as the SAP has failed to act upon evidence provided by eyewitnesses.

"Out of so many killings, there were only 137 arrests and no one has been found guilty since the region got engulfed in massive killings," he pointed out.

Anger spilled into the streets on 1 June, when Sergeant Marumo, his nephew and Lekoa's former mayor, Esau Mahlatsi, were necklaced.

Since the Boipatong massacre, the SAP says nine people have been necklaced. In addition, the SAP's Captain Piet van Deventer says eight policemen have been killed in unrest in the Vaal this year.

Morake says this is a direct response of residents to the status quo, which is aimed at "eliminating the key figures in the struggle for democracy."

"The situation is so ugly that the families of police officers are now staying in the police cells to avoid attacks," he said.

Divided Defence Units

According to Vavi, the attacks made the formation of self defence units (SDUs) necessary.

"The defence units are well organised and members of the units are chosen by the community, rather than being

self-appointed. If we tolerated that, some undesirable elements might hijack the main goal of securing peace in the community," he said.

Despite Vavi's claims, the SDUs have been plagued by division. The SDUs were based at KwaMasiza hostel, an ANC stronghold in Sebokeng. But a split developed between Numsa and ANC Vaal chairperson Ernest Sotsu, resulting in two separate defence structures.

The split seems to have emerged after Iscor introduced the 'Omega system,' a forum supposedly aimed at ensuring worker participation in company decisionmaking. When Iscor started retrenching people, some workers accused the shopstewards of siding with the management through the 'Omega system'.

Sotsu then allegedly accused Numsa shop stewards of being 'bought' by Iscor at a rally at KwaMasiza hostel, and urged the workers to revolt against the shopstewards.

Five Numsa shop stewards were mysteriously killed. Publicly their deaths were blamed on Inkatha members within Numsa, but this may not be the case.

Vavi says the situation was saved by the intervention of the ANC leader Nelson Mandela and the Cosatu leadership, who promised to set up a commission of inquiry comprised of members from the two factions. Sotsu also says the matter has been resolved.

However, while the 'formal' SDUs may be trying to overcome their differences, the self-appointed SDUs that have sprung up pose huge problems for community organisations.

Killings Likely To Continue

The undeclared war in the Vaal is unlikely to end unless the security forces are brought under neutral control, covert police operations are stopped and KwaMadala is closed.

But the burning question for those living in the Vaal is: how long will this take and how many people will have to die waiting for this to happen? After all, it took the Boipatong massacre for the world to notice what had been going on in the Vaal over the past two years.

Also, what will happen to those living in the Vaal in the meantime? The Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) has warned that services are about to collapse as only 11 percent of residents are paying service charges.

The defence units saga also shows how easily splits and tensions can develop in communities racked with poverty and violence. These splits are open to manipulation by outside forces, and it takes strong organisation to overcome such problems. With the current violence, it is impossible to build strong organisation.

*** ANC, PAC Youth**

92AF1256B Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS
in English Sep 92 pp 13-14

[Article by Mosito Raphela: "Youth Moves To Defend the Vaal"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Since the Boipatong massacre on 18 June, the youth from different political organisations in the Vaal have made efforts to unite to defend their community against attacks, which they believe are perpetrated by security forces.

The youth hope to bring about unity at two levels. Firstly, among the ANC [African National Congress]-aligned defence units, and secondly, between the youth from the different political organisations. Until recently there were two rival defence units in the Vaal, one accountable to the National Union of Metalworkers of SA [Republic of South Africa] (Numsa) and another under Ernesto Sotsu, chairperson of the ANC's Vaal sub-region (see main story). Although this division is still being resolved, there has been great progress in bringing together the youth of the ANC and PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress].

Youth Come Together

Sakhiwe Khumalo, the ANC Youth League's interim political education secretary in the Vaal, says it is imperative that youth unite. The aim of unity is to bring about peace, and a greater sense of responsibility among the youth. Khumalo sees a youth front as the only structure that will be able to champion the interests of the youth, not only in the Vaal but throughout the whole country.

According to Maurice More, ANCYL [African National Congress Youth League] Vaal interim publicity officer, "We youth leaguers do not have problems with other formations." However, there seems to be fierce competition for members. More claims that the league's Vaal membership has swollen to 6,000, with at least 2,000 members in Sebokeng alone, which is among the largest branches in the country. Many people have been put on a waiting list due to a shortage of membership cards, he adds.

Thabiso Mosokotso, Sharpville chairperson of the Azanian National Youth Unity (Azanyu)—the PAC's youth wing—says his structure was launched mainly to organise and politically educate the youth.

So far, Azanyu has five branches in the Vaal and two more will be launched within the next three months, says Mosokotso. Although Sharpeville seems to have the strongest branch, Mosotho Petlane, Azanyu's Vaal regional chairman, says Zamdela, which includes Evaton and New Farm, is the largest. He estimates that Sharpeville's signed up membership is around 300 while in Zamdela, the figure is well over 900. He goes on to challenge anyone who claims to be stronger or larger, to prove their claim.

Beyond this competition for members, the youth, regardless of political ideologies, are holding joint meetings to work out effective means of combatting violence. "We need to close the gaps that may be there between ourselves and other political structures," says Mosokotso.

He is convinced that those behind the violence have noticed that disunity among different organisations holds back the liberation struggle.

Initially, it was decided that the self defence units would be accountable to the community, a view held by a wide range of people including Azanyu. But Petlane says "unfortunately posters were flown around as if SDUs [self-defense units] were but a cocktail party." The challenge is to find ways to be accountable and security conscious.

Different Approaches

Although the ANCYL and Azanyu agree on the need for the defence of communities, there are differences in approach.

Azanyu has reservations about the ANCYL's call that streets be barricaded, as they believe it is only the taxis and private cars that suffer, while hippos and casspiers drive smoothly. But the Youth League's Khumalo is convinced that street barricades are one of the most effective means of self defence.

Azanyu is also concerned that, in bringing together black youth against the 'enemy', Inkatha will be left out. To remedy this, Azanyu has invited the Inkatha Youth Brigade (IYB) and Azapo's youth wing, the Azanian Youth Organisation (Azayo), to become part of a united youth front. A preparatory meeting for this youth front took place between the ANCYL and Azanyu on 6 July.

Khumalo is very sceptical of IYB's participation in the youth front, in light of Inkatha's involvement in the violence. "It is known that Inkatha is not a mass organisation," he adds; however, the IYB will be accepted "as soon as they improve their way of operation, especially on violence."

Meanwhile, the regional secretary of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, William Nhlapo, says his organisation has never been invited to unity talks, as Petlane claimed.

Nhlapo added that although the brigade indicated their willingness to be part of the youth front to ANCYL, they are not liked by the majority of people.

"We were part of the Crisis Committee after the Boipatong massacre, but were not invited to the broad forum," he said. IYB is anxious to be part of the youth front, as much as they are convinced that the defence of the community is paramount.

White Enemy?

But the definition of 'enemy' may pose problems for the unity of the youth. The ANC is adamant that Inkatha is a part of the state, while Azanyu seems to see their enemy only in terms of whites.

As Petlane warned: "Every person, young or old, aligned or non-aligned, is beginning to develop a hatred of whites. To attest to this, let a white man drive here (Sharpeville) during the night.

"It is these white people who have voted for De Klerk, and the people want De Klerk removed from power," he said, adding that one day maybe every white will be seen as the enemy by blacks.

Both Mosokotso and Petlane are weary of the noise made about white journalists being attacked at the Boipatong funeral.

"How many black people have been killed—whether necklaced by fellow blacks or shot by white police and SADF [South African Defense Force]? Yet when a white journalist is assaulted, then there is noise," they pointed out.

Petlane adds that the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] had sent white journalists to cover the funeral in the midst of the strike by the Media Workers Association of South Africa (Mwasa).

But Mosokotso argues that Azanyu was not responsible for the attacks, and blames a splinter group, the Revolutionary Watchdogs from the East Rand. Azanyu is consulting with the PAC's publicity secretary, Barney Desai, to discipline those responsible.

In response to Azanyu's assertion that the Vaal is a no-go area for whites, the ANCYL has invited white people to go into the Vaal and see if they will be attacked. Khumalo also urged the PAC to discipline those responsible for attacking white journalists, if they are members of the organisation.

* ANC-Led Mass Action Campaign Analyzed

92AF1255A Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS
in English Sep 92 pp 7-10

[Article by Kerry Cullinan: "Moving the Masses"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The cosiness that developed between the ANC [African National Congress] and the National Party (NP) at closed sessions of Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa] is lost forever. The Boipatong massacre and the ANC-SACP [South African Communist Party]-Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] mass action campaign has made sure of that.

But it is simply a matter of time before talks get back on track, perhaps using the Cosatu-Saccola [South African Consultative Committee on Labor Affairs] draft charter

for peace, democracy and economic reconstruction as the basis for an action-oriented way forward.

The National Party (NP) would like to go back to holding closed meetings with the ANC, as decided by its recent 'bosberaad'. But there is a strong feeling within the alliance, particularly from the SACP and Cosatu, that future negotiations be open to the public.

Compromise?

Compromise to get the talks back on track is inevitable, but what is the minimum the ANC will accept? One suggestion floating in ANC circles is that political compromises must be made in exchange for government compromises on security.

But SACP central committee member Jeremy Cronin says "a sovereign, elected constituent assembly is precisely the demand we can't compromise on." Cronin says he sees no evidence that this view is gaining ground within the ANC, pointing out that even Herman Cohen, the U.S. secretary for African Affairs, recently expressed support for an elected body to draw up the constitution.

ANC leaders' recent talk about a 'constitution making body' instead of a constituent assembly may represent a compromise on terminology, but not on content, says Cronin.

But the weakening of international support for the ANC may mean that the organisation has to compromise more than it would like to. The United Nations Resolution 765 emphasises "the responsibility of the South African authorities to take all the necessary measures to stop immediately the violence." But its main concern seems to be ensuring the "cooperation of all parties in the resumption of the negotiating process as speedily as possible."

However, the ANC leadership is now tied by decisions adopted at the organisation's policy conference, which include its commitment to a single chamber constituent assembly. If political compromises are to be made, the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) will be obliged to call a national meeting.

The policy conference has already directed the NEC to "convene a special national conference...to map out an integrated strategic perspective for the transitional period" after regions expressed unhappiness with the way in which negotiations had been conducted.

Saccola Agreement

Although the Boipatong massacre on 17 June shifted the balance of forces in favour of the alliance, the shift was not big enough for De Klerk's old allies to make a decisive break with the past.

Cosatu was unable to get the SA [Republic of South Africa] Coordinating Council on Labour Affairs [as published] (Saccola) to agree to a 24-hour shutdown for peace, democracy and economic reconstruction.

Cosatu general secretary Jay Naidoo said the negotiating teams on both sides had "acted in good faith" but that Saccola had been prevented from getting a mandate to endorse the agreement by "an intransigent element in big business who was influenced and lobbied by the government."

But even within Cosatu, the agreement was greeted with a degree of suspicion. One of Cosatu's biggest affiliates, the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa), abstained from voting on the agreement at a recent central executive committee meeting.

Many within the tripartite alliance secretly welcomed Saccola's failure to agree to the shut-down. It would have caused confusion and dampened mass action, they argued.

Had business also persuaded the state to let public servants observe the day of reconciliation, business would have been seen as the conciliators and 'rolling mass action' would probably have stopped in its tracks.

However, a key aspect of the Cosatu-Saccola talks was discussion around the 'draft charter for peace, democracy and economic reconstruction.' Naidoo says there was general agreement on the charter which, for Cosatu, still stands.

This charter, which church leaders are trying to sell to other parties, has the potential to get talks moving again. One of the key sections of the charter deals with political transition, calling for "an elected constitution making body unfettered in its capacity to agree and adopt a constitution...which shall also perform the dual function of a transitional parliament." Aside from committing parties to principles, the charter contains a series of concrete steps to combat violence and poverty.

But while mass action has not isolated the government in the way that the alliance hoped it would, the NP's decision to stall the Codesa negotiations to give it time to win black voters has also backfired.

For a start, it made a strategic blunder at Codesa II by choosing to dig in its heels over percentages. A popular joke in the tripartite alliance is that the NP's stubborn attitude saved the ANC from selling out at Codesa.

The ANC's very generous—and unmandated—offer that the new constitution be passed by a 70 percent majority will not be repeated. The ANC's policy conference, convened shortly after the deadlock, resolved that the constitution should be passed by a two thirds majority.

Had the NP seized the ANC's 70 percent offer, the ANC would have lost support among its supporters for "selling out."

Preventing Anarchy

Mass action also provides the ANC with a tremendous opportunity to recruit new members in the run up to national elections. SACP central committee member Jeremy Cronin says mass action, while guided by the

strategic aim of transferring power, is also aimed at "organising, helping and facilitating grassroots struggle."

"Some problems have occurred because insufficient attention was paid to organising grassroots struggles," continued Cronin. "We have to show that we are committed to helping people on a constant level; that we will not turn them on or off or walk away from their problems."

He argues that unless there is organised, directed mass action, the result will be anarchy as people will act in anger.

The Vaal is probably the best example of how individuals acting outside of organisational control, motivated by fear and anger, can bring anarchy. There have been numerous reports of armed youths patrolling the streets of Vaal townships.

Many of these youths do not know the political leadership in their township and have become a rule unto themselves. As a result, technicians are too afraid to enter the townships to repair broken services, something that can only have a negative effect on the community.

The tripartite alliance is also closing ranks and attracting more allies. The recently formed Coalition On State Murder and Corruption—which draws together a wide range of political, civic, union, church and human rights bodies—has the potential to become a popular movement for democracy, once again bringing the mass democratic movement to life.

Reassessing Negotiations

The deadlock has also allowed the tripartite alliance to reassess its negotiations strategy. At its recent living wage conference, Cosatu delegates said Codesa "excluded the masses, was too technical, long and uncoordinated."

Cosatu says it wants "a new kind of negotiations process which is simpler, has clearer time frames and is controlled and guided by the masses. There should not be a long, drawn out process." The federation and the SACP are also calling for Codesa proceedings to be public.

The ANC has not yet decided whether it wants the form of Codesa to change. However, there is agreement within the alliance that the content of negotiations must change. The alliance wants negotiations to focus on the transfer of power.

In his open letter to De Klerk, ANC president Nelson Mandela said the "constitution making body" had to be the focus of the negotiations. The NP, said Mandela, has "elevated the transitional arrangements to the central focus" which betrayed its "pre-occupation with obtaining guarantees of a constitutionally entrenched role for the NP."

ANC chief negotiator Mohammed Valli Moosa explains that the democratic movement is no longer prepared "to go back to the table to debate whether there should be a democratic process. There must be agreement upfront on democratic elections."

Moosa adds that the ANC "accepts the need for a legal and constitutional framework to work towards a constituent assembly," but that it did not see this framework as the interim constitution being demanded by the government.

"We want the 1983 SA constitution amended to make democratic elections possible. But we are opposed to the NP's position that Codesa drafts an interim constitution, which will then be virtually impossible to change as the NP wants all constitutional changes to be made by a 75 percent majority," said Moosa.

Rules to Negotiations

But as Cronin points out, the ANC is not homogeneous in its approach to negotiations. He argues that "real unity of strategic purpose not apparent unity" based on a "realistic, revolutionary, mass-based strategy" is the only way forward.

He identifies three broad strategic positions within the ANC since 2 February 1990:

- Those who do not want to "rock the boat" of negotiations as they believe that the path to democracy depends "primarily upon negotiated pacts between elites. Elites 'delivered' their constituencies. The job of constituencies is 'to be delivered.'"
- Those who see mass action as "a tap to be turned on and off" to pressurise the state at the negotiations table. This outlook, he says, also sees "elite negotiations as the royal road to the 'transfer of power to the people.'"
- Those who favour the "Leipzig" way, a mass uprising in which the people transfer power to themselves "in an insurrectionary moment." While this approach is not elitist, it is also unrealistic given the "relatively coherent and relatively powerful repressive machinery of the apartheid regime."

Most of the ANC's National Working Committee (NWC) seem to see mass action as a 'tap'. It 'turned off' the armed struggle with limited consultation. It also 'turned off' the Border region's mass action campaign in March, aimed at unseating Ciskei's Oupa Gqozo. ANC president Nelson Mandela then told the June 16 rally in Soweto that the mass action campaign was aimed at "breaking the Codesa deadlock."

Unless regional structures of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu assert themselves now, before they know it negotiations will be back on track and rank and file members will be informed of what is happening through the press.

Cosatu affiliates have asserted their commitment to continuous mass action. Their position can probably be

summed up by Numsa's resolution that mass action "should continue until the transfer of power is agreed."

Cronin and ANC political education head Raymond Suttner take this further. They argue that mass action must continue even after the transfer of power is achieved, to ensure that power is not simply transferred from one political party to another, but that ordinary people have control over their lives.

A strong feeling surfaced at a recent Cosatu central executive committee that the federation needed to be more assertive in the alliance. Until now, say some unionists, the ANC did the strategising and expected Cosatu to provide the muscle power.

It is possible that when negotiations get back on track, Cosatu will expect to be included in strategising about negotiations in a more meaningful way.

But there is also opposition to this from within Cosatu. Jerry Majatladi, information officer for the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), says the negotiation process "moves too quickly" for Cosatu—with its limited and inexperienced person power—to keep up.

"Cosatu should concentrate on strengthening its regions and building unity with Nactu," said Majatladi. "Cosatu can rather lobby the ANC and the Party. It can even set up a political desk to do this."

Industrial Action

Many Cosatu affiliates are also taking advantage of the mass action mood to settle what the Food and Allied Workers Union (Fawu) assistant secretary Mike Madlala calls "outstanding issues" with employers.

Over the past few years, unions have often had to shelve demands for centralised bargaining, job creation and a moratorium on retrenchments once a wage agreement has been reached. These are being taken up with fresh vigour by unions.

Unions involved in wage disputes have also been given new courage by the campaign. Cosatu's Living Wage Conference on 30 June resolved to "coordinate to ensure that major strikes...should start at more or less the same time."

Industrial action is set to sweep the steel, engineering, commercial, catering, chemical, paper, food, mining and public sectors.

The SA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saccawu) is in dispute with Checkers over retrenchments and shop steward victimisation and it plans to ballot OK workers on wage and retrenchment demands.

The Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ppawu) held nationwide marches on 29 June,

demanding a moratorium on retrenchments and centralised bargaining. Sappi tried to tie a 12-month moratorium on retrenchments to some Ppwawu members working during mass action. The union rejected this.

The Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) has called all employers in the petro-chemical, consumer chemical, rubber, plastic and glass sectors to a meeting on 26 August to establish a centralised bargaining structure. If employers refuse—which is likely—the union plans to declare a dispute with the entire industry and ballot for industrial action. There is also the real possibility of 5,000 CWIU members going on strike at Sasol [South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation] collieries, and another 4,000 striking at Sasol itself.

Fawu has sent letters of demand to employers, covering a range of issues from job creation and a living wage to the extension of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) to farmworkers. The union also wants an industry-wide meeting with employers to discuss food price hikes, the drought and food distribution.

Mrungisi Hlongwane, general secretary of the Post and Telecommunication Workers Association (Potwa), says Potwa is linking Cosatu's demand for an end to unilateral economic restructuring to an end to the privatisation of the post office and the resignation of Telecom's board of directors.

"The demand for the resignation of Telecom's board is linked to the demand for independent control over the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation]. You cannot discuss independent control over the SABC in isolation from Telkom, as it is completely dependent on Telkom for its networking," said Hlongwane.

The Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU) is campaigning for centralised bargaining, an end to retrenchment and the reimposition of bus subsidies. T&GWU assistant secretary Randall Howard said some 15,000 contract cleaners were being balloted after efforts to for an industrial council has failed in all regions except Natal.

At the time of going to press, the NUM had held 17 mass marches at mines around the country involving over 100,000 workers, aimed mainly at ending retrenchments.

Delivering the Goods

The NP, portions of business and the media have labelled the mass action campaign as ineffective on the one hand and bringing anarchy on the other.

Yet no other campaign could better demonstrate the central demand of the alliance: one person, one vote. Mass action and the withholding of labour are the 'traditional weapons' of the democratic movement, whose members do not have access to the corridors of power.

However, what seems clear is that people are getting tired of the same forms of protest. It is no longer possible to attract large numbers to frequent marches and pickets.

Such actions appear to achieve little for the majority, whose material conditions have generally worsened since February 1990.

Unless the alliance is seen to be delivering to people, both in national negotiations and at a local level, it is certain to lose support. However much the NP is blamed for apartheid, if it succeeds in persuading people that it can improve their lives, it will win votes.

*** NP Youth Opposes Party's Election Strategy**

92AF1265B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 3 Sep 92 p 11

[Article by Derek Fleming and Paul Stober: "Youth vs Age in NP Election Plan"; first paragraph is THE WEEKLY MAIL introduction]

[Text] As the National Party [NP] gears up for non-racial elections, the hardliners are drawing on old "winning hearts and minds" strategies. But the young Nats are far from happy.

Tensions are burgeoning between the old guard of the National Party and its younger members over how the party, facing South Africa's first non-racial election, can hold on to power.

Under the leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, the NP in the Transvaal has drawn up a plan to ensure the party wins the majority of votes in the province. These guidelines have been circulated to party structures nationally.

The document, which THE WEEKLY MAIL has acquired, is littered with terminology from the days of total strategy, identifying Africans as the primary target of an NP push to expand its base.

It urges branches to start immediately cultivating the concept of "winning hearts and minds", canvassing support and members, using propaganda and information, protecting members from intimidation and "training members for democracy".

The document also reveals that the NP intends to concentrate large resources and personnel to build the infrastructure needed to co-ordinate and support its recruitment drive. According to sources, the NP believes business will back its election effort.

Botha is said to believe the government's experience in Namibia, where the South West African People's Organisation was successfully denied a two thirds majority in the constituent assembly, is proof the plan will succeed.

The election plan is considered madness by younger members of the NP, who believe no black South African is likely to vote for the party after the experience of apartheid.

Young Nationalists, especially those from the Cape, are said to feel the plan is dismissive of the Indian and coloured voters in the Transvaal, which will be the most important province if elections are held on the basis of proportional representation.

They also believe that with the coloured vote, the NP can win an election in the western Cape, especially as the ANC [African National Congress] has not succeeded in building a strong support base in the coloured community.

Young nationalists are reported to be concerned that they will be low on the NP list of nominations for central government, and feel their best option would be to stand for regional government positions in a federal South Africa.

Many are said to be convinced a NP election campaign, with the party in its present form, could not win 25 percent of the national vote and want to contest the first election as part of a centre party including elements of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Democratic Party.

It appears that except for the cabinet, most Nationalists are mentally preparing themselves to be in opposition.

The NP old guard, including Correctional Services Minister Adriaan Vlok, Water Affairs and Forestry Minister Magnus Malan and Housing and Local Government Minister Leon Wessels want the party's name and symbols to remain unchanged.

These hardliners stress that a merger of these parties before Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa] III, or its equivalent, would be premature. They would prefer a multitude of parties to be seen to be allied with them against the ANC alliance.

The stalled negotiations process has the NP strategists, who want to set the pace of the national political agenda, frustrated.

According to NP director of information Piet Coetzer: "Elections are not top priority for us at the moment, but they are certainly something we are not ignoring. Let's first negotiate the model—that should be top priority."

Observers believe the election plan signals that the NP has now accepted that a two thirds majority will be sufficient to pass the new constitution.

A dispute between the government and the ANC on the percentage needed for adoption of a new constitution was the primary reason for Codesa II's failure to agree on a package of agreements to transfer power from the government.

* Results of Western Cape Business Survey

92AF1265C Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS
in English 15-16 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Tom Hood, business editor: "Western Cape Gets Thumbs-Up"; first paragraph is WEEKEND ARGUS introduction]

[Text] Home is where the profits are, according to the latest survey of business owners in the Cape.

More than 41 percent of Cape business owners believe the commercial environment in the Western Cape is improving compared with other regions.

Greater political stability and increased tourism were cited in the latest Western Cape Business Survey as the two main reasons.

However, respondents were short-sightedly dependent on the Western Cape and its environs, said the survey's sponsors, Arthur Andersen and Co, the Graduate School of Business at UCT [University of Cape Town] and Wesgro.

In the past five years, 80 percent of turnover was generated in the Western Cape, with 78 percent forecast for 1992. Only six percent saw competition from other regions as a potential problem.

The six main factors seen as having the most impact on owner-managed business were local economic conditions, interest rates, inflation, the value of the rand, the change in the international perceptions of South Africa and transport costs.

Strategic planning and written business plans were given high priority, but 43 percent of respondents admitted they had not considered the future direction of their businesses.

The sponsors said: "Seen against the backdrop of South Africa's volatile and dynamic political and economic environment, the need for strategic planning becomes even more urgent."

An overwhelming 90 percent of business owners said VAT was a better form of indirect taxation than general sales tax, compared with only 15 percent in the previous survey.

Respondents said VAT had the advantages of spreading the tax burden more widely and reducing evasion and the disadvantages of extra administration and costs.

The fourth annual Western Cape business survey was mailed to about 4,000 business owners and the results represent the views of about 500 respondents, giving what is considered a "very satisfactory" response rate of 12.5 percent.

A profile of the respondents reveals that 69 percent had a post-matric qualification, 42 percent were university graduates, their average age was 46 and their businesses

employed an average of 43 employees with an average annual turnover of R5 million [rands].

Owner-managed businesses constitute a major part of the economy. This survey represents the views of a diverse group of chief executives about issues of concern to them and the changes they deem necessary to foster and protect the entrepreneurial spirit in South Africa.

The results reveal that they forecast negative real growth in 1992, with wage increases and general political issues fuelling inflation.

Owner-managers expected the average rate of inflation this year to be about 16.5 percent, in spite of the belief of Reserve Bank Governor Dr Chris Stals that it could be 11 percent by the end of the year.

Thirty-two percent perceived an inflation rate of more than 18 percent.

Executives of the top 100 companies listed on the JSE [Johannesburg Stock Exchange] forecast that the prime overdraft rate would slip to 18 percent by the end of the year. They were also more optimistic than Western Cape owner-managers in forecasting inflation at about 15 percent.

Angola**Reportage on Multiparty Elections****'General Calm' Prevails**

*MB2909124392 Luanda Radio Nacional Network
in Portuguese 1200 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] The first multiparty elections in Angola's history have become a reality. Polling stations opened at 0700 [0600 GMT] today, and ballots began to be cast to decide the country's future over the next five years. The first multiparty elections to choose a new president of the Republic and members of the future parliament are being held against a backdrop of general calm and order.

Engineer Jose Eduardo dos Santos, outgoing president of the Republic and candidate for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, cast his vote at about 1115. Alvaro Holden Roberto, candidate for the Angola National Liberation Front, and Antonio Neto, for the Angolan Democratic Party, have also cast their votes. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, presidential candidate for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, has not yet voted, but is likely to do so in Luanda's Quicolo Ward at approximately 1400.

Large numbers of voters have reported to polling stations. In Luanda at 0500, voters [words indistinct] awaited for the opening of polling stations [words indistinct].

Antonio Caetano de Sousa, chairman of the National Electoral Council, has already assured that voting hours will be flexible.

[Begin De Sousa recording] In principle, polling stations close at 1900. Should there be more people ready to vote at 1900, they will vote. So, polling stations can close at 2000, 2100, 2200, or at 2400. Polling stations can only close once people have exercised their right to vote. [end recording]

Savimbi Casts Vote

MB2909201292 Windhoek Namibian Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 1900 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] In Angola hundreds of supporters turned out this afternoon to watch UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] leader Jonas Savimbi cast his vote in the presidential and legislative elections.

Our team in Angola reports that this was in stark contrast to the small group in attendance when President Jose Eduardo dos Santos voted this morning. Savimbi voted in Icolo township 13 kilometers north of the capital Luanda at four [1500 GMT] this afternoon and the large crowd caused a minor riot which resulted in Savimbi's bodyguards injuring several people in the crush.

Voting is progressing very slowly with between 25 and 30 people being processed an hour at most of the polling

stations in the capital. Polls will stay open late tonight in an effort to speed up the voting process.

First Day Turnout

*MB3009111892 London BBC World Service in English
0330 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[Live telephone interview with correspondent Anita Coulson in Luanda by Carolyn Dempster in London on the "Network Africa" program]

[Text] [Dempster] It's the second day of voting in the country's first democratic elections and to mark the occasion we are linking up with Anita Coulson. Anita, good morning to you.

[Coulson] Good morning, Carolyn.

[Dempster] Not a very good line unfortunately, but lets press on. Anita, you have been out on the streets during voting yesterday, and obviously this morning. How has it all been going?

[Coulson] Well, yesterday was an extraordinary day. People were queuing up for hours and hours in order to be able to vote, and it was very calm, very orderly in most places. There were a couple of places where there was a little bit of confusion with too many people, but all in all it was an excellent day.

[Dempster] Is it possible to estimate how many of the 5 million voters, who, I believe are eligible to vote, have in fact already gone to the polls?

[Coulson] It is not exactly clear what percentage has turned out already because many of them, of course, were still waiting when the polls closed yesterday evening, and they are going to have to come back again this morning to try again to queue and successfully cast their ballots.

[Dempster] Now, I thought that people's patience was such that queues were stretching virtually for miles, and there was one woman who, in the heat, actually gave birth to a baby while waiting to vote?

[Coulson] Yes, there have been some extraordinary reports. I spoke to a family of three women, a mother and her two daughters, who had actually left a funeral vigil to go and queue to vote, and one of the daughters said to me very tearfully that her only sorrow was that her father couldn't be there with them. It would have been the first time in his life that he would have cast the vote.

[Dempster] Now, what are the various leaders of the political parties saying? I know that Eduardo dos Santos, who leads the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] party, and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], have both said that they are out to win. Is there any indication yet of who might be ahead?

[Coulson] There is no indication from the votes cast themselves because the leader of the National Electoral Council gave instructions that the boxes should not be opened on the first night. They should be kept sealed and under guard so that people can continue to vote today and it won't be until tonight, probably around midnight, that we begin to get an idea of what the count is going to say. Everyone, all the observers in Luanda do believe that it's a two-horse race, that really and truly it's a question of: Is it going to be Mr. Dos Santos reelected or is it going to be Mr. Savimbi.

[Dempster] What about the problem province of Cabinda? We have had quite a lot of violence there by the separatists. Have people been going to the polls up in the north?

[Coulson] We haven't got a lot of information out of Cabinda, and in any case we have heard that only 16,000 out of the 80,000 expected electorate were registered in the first place. When I spoke yesterday to Mr. Tony da Costa Fernandes, the former leading member of UNITA who, of course, defected in February this year, and I asked him whether he thought that there would be a good turn out in Cabinda, he said to me that there is not going to be an election at all in Cabinda. The Cabindans themselves won't be voting.

Mozambique

Dhlakama Agrees To Sign Peace Accord

MB3009113692 Johannesburg Radio South Africa Network in English 1100 GMT 30 Sep 92

[Text] The Mozambican peace agreement which was in the balance has been saved by the intervention of the South African Government. A government spokesman confirmed that Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha had held talks last night with Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] leader Afonso Dhlakama who has since agreed to sign the peace agreement with the Mozambican Government. The agreement will end 16 years of civil war in the country.

Earlier, Mr. Dhlakama expressed reservation about certain aspects of the peace agreement and refused to attend yesterday's planned meeting. Mr. Botha leaves for Rome tonight to attend tomorrow's signing ceremony as an observer.

Renamo Declines To Sign General Peace Accord

'Technical' Difficulties

MB2909183192 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1730 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Interview with Transport and Communications Minister Armando Emilio Guebuza by unidentified Radio Mozambique reporters in Rome on 29 September; first paragraph is studio introduction—recorded]

[Text] A few hours before the communique announcing that the Mozambique general peace accord would no longer be signed on 1 October, Transport and Communications Minister Armando Guebuza, head of the government team to the Rome peace talks, granted an interview to the Radio Mozambique correspondents in the Italian capital.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister Armando Guebuza: I believe we are less than 48 hours away from the possible signing of the Mozambique peace accord. Mr. Minister: What would you like to say about the final stages of this process?

[Guebuza] Well, we are ready. Our president has already left Mozambique and is on his way to Rome. The more important guests, at the level of heads of state, are also expected in Rome today or tomorrow. They are Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and Botswana President Quett Masire. As regards documents, the most delicate issues have already been settled. They were, namely, the number of soldiers in the new army, the fate of the State Information and Security Service [SISE] and of the police, and public administration issues. President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama discussed those points and overcame those difficulties. Only certain concrete technical problems still remain to be resolved. They concern the guarantees, the cease-fire accord and, obviously, the donor conference, which must take place shortly after the signing of the cease-fire accord.

According to what we see in the documents, there are no major technical problems. Those documents were issued more than one month ago. We also made our comments on the two principal documents more than one month ago. In fact, we commented on all of them. Unfortunately, the Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] has not yet presented any comments on those documents. Nonetheless, we think those documents are of a technical and tactical nature. It does not seem to us that they pose major problems. We met last week to decide on methods to overcome these problems. Unfortunately, that is delaying the process, but the documents are under our responsibility. To our minds, these are details that Renamo could float yet again. We are, however, ready to negotiate and move forward to ensure that the accord is signed on 1 October.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister: You have just referred to certain technical problems that are still there. Could you please be more specific about those technical problems?

[Guebuza] In fact, I would like to refer to them as technical aspects, rather than technical problems in those documents. They are aspects of a technical nature that are still outstanding. The way the final text is to be presented, there is the need to adjust the timetable to ensure the program is correctly implemented. Perhaps there is the need to clarify one concept. That is what we think could still be a difficulty.

No 1 Oct Signing

*MB2909173892 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network
in Portuguese 1732 GMT 29 Sep 92*

[Text] Quoting a communique issued by the mediators, Italian Ambassador to Mozambique Manfredo di Camerana has confirmed that the Mozambique general peace accord will no longer be signed on 1 October. No new date has been set for the signing of the accord.

Ambassador Manfredo di Camerana said Afonso Dhlakama, Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] leader, believes the delegations must still clear certain points connected with the cease-fire, before he travels to Rome.

Meanwhile, President Joaquim Chissano has already arrived in Rome.

Chissano 'Reconsidering'

*MB3009060492 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network
in Portuguese 0500 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[Report by correspondent Emilio Manhique with recorded statement by Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano in Rome on 30 September]

[Text] The signing of Mozambique's general peace accord, scheduled to take place in Rome on 1 October, has been postponed. Our Rome correspondent has the latest details:

[Manhique] The Mozambique peace accord could be signed on 1 October as scheduled. In fact, President of the Republic Joaquim Chissano told newsmen at dawn today that he had received a telephone call from Manfredo di Camerana, Italian ambassador in Maputo, confirming that Afonso Dhlakama would come to Rome. Chissano said he expects that Dhlakama will come with the intention of signing the accord. The president noted that the texts of the final accord had been agreed in a spirit of major concessions, particularly during the last few days when the Mozambique National Resistance representative in Maputo and Ambassador di Camerana traveled to Gorongosa.

The Mozambican head of state said that he knew that Dhlakama was worried about certain requirements demanded by the United Nations, and which both sides should comply with. He added, however, that such requirements cannot in any way prevent the signing of a cease-fire. Chissano regretted the inconvenience that had been caused to foreign officials, namely heads of state, prime ministers, and delegations that had already left for Rome. Chissano said, quote, unfortunately, we had to ask them to be on stand by, unquote.

I asked President Chissano whether he would pack his bags and return to Maputo if Dhlakama failed to arrive in Rome on 1 October. He said:

[Chissano] I think that we have come here in search of peace. So, we cannot make hasty decisions. I have not

come to Rome to [words indistinct]. I have come to Rome because we had agreed to be here. He says he will come, but if he does not, then I will have to reconsider. Right now we are reconsidering things. So, let us see what we will do next. One should not search for peace on the basis of tailored guidelines [words indistinct]. We should do our best to ensure that peace returns to Mozambique. That is what I will do. I will do it to the best of my ability.

Renamo Explanation Sought

*LD3009100192 Lisbon RDP Antena 1 Radio Network
in Portuguese 0800 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[Text] Mozambique is still waiting for peace. President Chissano, who is in Rome, spoke to us on the phone this morning. He told us he is waiting for [Renamo leader] Afonso Dhlakama and that he is ready to talk to him. Dhlakama has agreed to everything with the Mozambican Government. The president said he does not know what these last minute hitches are about.

[Begin recording] [Chissano] On the matter of Renamo-controlled areas, we discussed it in Gaborone and we reached a certain agreement; then we drew up documents on this matter and we reached a conclusion. On the basis of this conclusion, I sent the text to our delegation and then to mediators so that it will be included in the final document.

[Unidentified correspondent] So what do you say to Dhlakama's stance of not yet being ready to sign a cease-fire?

[Chissano] I believe he is the one who has to explain, since he is on his way, he will talk to me then I will have an answer. At the moment I do not know what he is talking about.

[Correspondent] It is clear that Dhlakama is insisting on the idea that Renamo wants to keep the administration of the territories it says it controls. Are you willing to make any concessions on this matter?

[Chissano] Mr. Dhlakama said that there should only be one administration in Mozambique; he has never spoken to me about the idea of keeping the administration of any area. He spoke to me about other things, which were the subject of the documents which we signed, or rather which we agreed on to be signed within the context of the protocols.

[Correspondent] Can I assume you are not willing to make these concessions even if it jeopardizes the peace agreement?

[Chissano] I am explaining that I am not aware of any concessions, I have not been asked to make concessions. How can I answer if I am ignorant about these concessions? I am saying there is a text which has been agreed, hence if there were any concessions they have been made

already. I do not know what you are talking about because Dhlakama has not said anything to me. [end recording]

Renamo Chief Not To Attend

*AU3009092192 Paris AFP in English 0809 GMT
30 Sep 92*

[Text] Rome, Sept 30 (AFP)—The leader of the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) will not attend the signing here Thursday of a peace agreement aimed at ending Mozambique's 16-year civil war, the Italian Foreign Ministry said Wednesday.

Afonso Dhlakama had "strong reservations about some points of the latest documents being worked out, so he feels he cannot be in Rome" to seek an agreement before October 1, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Mediators in the peace talks here have called on the Renamo chief to go back on his decision, saying "controversial issues do not justify a suspension of the scheduled program."

The peace negotiations began in the Italian capital almost two years ago on the initiative of the Roman Catholic community of Sant'Egidio, which runs many humanitarian operations in the Third World.

The archbishop of the Mozambican port of Beira, Jaime Goncalves, and an Italian diplomat, Mario Raffaelli, have also been mediating the bid to bring peace to the devastated, famine-stricken southeast African nation.

President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, accompanied by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, arrived here Tuesday.

The agreement between the Chissano regime and the Renamo rebels to end the civil war was reached in August.

Dhlakama last week said there were some hitches in the talks, leaving some doubt as to whether the signing would go ahead Thursday as planned.

In Pretoria, the South African government said Tuesday that it would send Foreign Minister Pik Botha to the signing ceremony.

President Frederik de Klerk's office said in a brief statement that Chissano had invited De Klerk himself, but the latter could not make it at short notice and would send Botha instead.

South Africa backed Renamo against the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front until Pretoria signed the Nkomati Accord of non-aggression with Chissano's immediate predecessor Samora Machel in March 1984.

De Klerk's office said South Africa "strongly welcomes the signing of this agreement and trusts that it will lay the basis for a lasting peace in Mozambique and greater stability in the region."

Dhlakama Reasons Cited

*MB3009084592 London BBC World Service in English
0330 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[From "The African News" program]

[Text] The Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] leader in Mozambique, Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, has been explaining why he decided not to attend the planned signing of a cease-fire in Rome tomorrow. In an interview with Portuguese television, Mr. Dhlakama said the Mozambique Government, Renamo, and the United Nations first had to agree on assembly areas for government troops and Renamo fighters. He said provision also had to be made for Renamo to administer regions it controlled until a new government was elected.

Dhlakama Interviewed

*MB3009113892 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[Report on interview with Afonso Dhlakama, president of the Mozambique National Resistance, by Gabriel Mussavele in Maringue on 29 September—recorded]

[Text] [Dhlakama] I can only go to Rome when my men, who are there with Raul Domingos, and the Mozambique Liberation Front [Frelimo] delegation led by Minister Guebuza, confirm that they and the United Nations have agreed on how troops will be confined. Why do I say this? I am not interested in going to Rome on 1 October to sign something that will not work. Moreover, all heads of state who have been invited will be there for no avail, so, that would be an embarrassment for the Mozambicans. I am not prepared to play games with the Mozambican people. I want a clear-cut accord so that President Chissano and I will sign something concrete, a lasting accord that will put an end to the war, and pave the way for elections.

I would like to reiterate that I am not willing to go to Rome to play games with the Mozambican people because I know that no document will be signed on 1 October because there are some outstanding issues.

[Announcer] The confinement of troops was further raised in the interview with Afonso Dhlakama. The Renamo leader said that UN officials, who were in Maringue last week, will be in Rome to make proposals on the confinement of troops. Afterward, Dhlakama added, the delegations will discuss the issue and then the respective leaders will reach an agreement.

[Mussavele] What are your views on the confinement of troops?

[Dhlakama] Taking into consideration what has happened in other countries, you should take cognizance of the fact that Renamo forces are scattered throughout the country. Frelimo forces are also present in certain districts. It would be difficult for the UN teams to go from base to base to monitor all of them. There should be well defined assembly points agreed by the two sides. For instance, there should be no more of 15 to 30 assembly points throughout the country. Renamo troops should report to those points. Likewise, Frelimo should have 30, 40 or 15 assembly points to where all its troops should report. The United Nations and the joint Renamo-government commission will then demobilize troops, and select those which will form part of the future national army.

So, it is not easy to reach an agreement on all those issues. People ought to realize that there can be no peace unless an agreement is reached, otherwise Frelimo and Renamo troops will remain scattered. Nobody will be able to monitor them, and combat operations might continue.

So, I would like to emphasize that this question of the UN role on the confinement of troops is very, very, very important because unless we agree on that, there will be no peace in Mozambique.

Zambia

Police Shoot One Dead at Demonstration

MB2909184292 Lusaka Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 1800 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] One person was shot dead in Lusaka today when police tried to disperse University of Zambia students attending the hearing of their colleagues' case at the Magistrates' Court. It is not yet clear whether the young man was a student, although both Vice President Levy Mwanawasa and Home Affairs Minister Newstead Zimba have confirmed receiving reports of the incident. But some students claimed the deceased was their colleague. Mr. Zimba said he was awaiting more details on the matter in which police fired live ammunition from their AK-47 rifles at [word indistinct] students.

One of the paramilitary officers at the scene confirmed the ZNBC [Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation] news that the police were using live ammunition, in spite of the fact that the students were not violent. It all started when police opened fire in the air to clear the way for their vehicles which were about to leave the court. One student is meanwhile lying in the University Hospital with a fractured leg (?from) the incident, while others were treated and discharged.

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